THE ARYAN PATH

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December 1966

NAMRATA
Mystic Awareness

ROY WALKER
The End of the Way of Man

G. SRINIVASAN
Sartre and Sankhya

C. RAJAGOPALACHARI
The Unification of Cultures

BOOKS REVIEWED INCLUDE

From Mind to Super-Mind: A Commentary on the Bhagavad-Gita; *The Philosophy of Hegel*; *Hymns from the Vedas*; *The Moving Image: Science and Religion, Time and Eternity*; *The Making of South East Asia*; *East and West*

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however dimly and lost among the host —
as does the Evening Star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and
lost among the host — as does the evening star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

— *The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XXXVII DECEMBER 1966 No. 12

Mystic Awareness

Know the Ātman *as Lord of the Chariot, the body as the Chariot itself: know the* buddhi *to be the Charioteer and the mind* (manas) *as the reins.*

The senses, they say, are the Horses, the sense-objects the path on which they run. The Ātman *united to senses and mind is said by the wise to be the Experiencer* (bhoktā).

He who is without intuitive judgement and whose mind (manas) *is not constantly controlled, his senses become unmanageable like the vicious horses of a charioteer.*

But he who has intuitive judgement, whose mind is ever held firm, his senses are controllable like the good horses of a charioteer.

—*Kaṭhopaniṣad,* III. 3-6

Without insight there is no meditation and also without meditation there is no insight. With both insight and meditation one approaches Nirvāṇa.

—*Dhammapada,* XXV. 13

The reality of the person is in the creative will. When we deny the clamour of emotions, stay the stream of things, silence the appetites of the body, we feel the power of self within our own being. Again, the delusion of self leads man to strive to profit himself and injure others. The passionate sense of egoism is the root of the world's unhappiness. To be egoistic is to be like a rudimentary creature that has grown no eyes. It is to be blind to the reality of other persons. We begin to grow only when we break down our clinging to the envelopes of the body and mind and realize that we have our roots in a state which is untouched by the familiar dimensions of this world. Detachment from ego means a gentler, profounder, sympathy with all sentient creation. It is the recovery of wholeness, of an ordered nature in harmony with the cosmos.

—S. RADHAKRISHNAN

EVERYONE who is not a rank and brutal materialist has experienced at one time or another an awareness of a world which transcends that of

the outer senses. While such an experience may be prompted, and often is, by sensuous perception and originates in, let us say, a beautiful sight — the starry firmament, a lovely sunset, a flowing river — the intense emotional response soon induces a higher state which satisfies a deeper aspect of one's consciousness. The occasions of such experiences are many and varied and come to different people in different ways. If genuine they have one common factor: they bring a perception of something which transcends the senses and opens up a vista of a sphere of reality beyond the outer world of objective phenomena.

If we pause and analyse these moments of greater awareness, we find that they become possible when we forget our little selves. A beautiful sight, a melody, a poem, to which we respond intensely momentarily enables us to forget the personal ego, *ahaṁkāra,* and it is this self-forgetfulness that in turn enables us to reach a deeper level of consciousness. This indicates the need for detachment and impersonality, and explains why unselfishness has been emphasized by all the great teachers as a *sine qua non* condition for the spiritual aspirant.

But while many have such glimpses of an inner world, they too often fail to take much notice of them and do not question to ascertain the meaning of the experience. If asked about it they would likely agree that they derived joy and satisfaction from such touches of a transcendental reality. Soon, however, even the memory of the experience begins to fade away and the humdrum of the outward life once more claims and fully absorbs the mind's attention. The fact is, most people are "externally oriented." The mind is turned outwards, aware only of the external world, and does not easily turn inwards. Many ignore and even deny the inner world. And some who sense its reality are not always willing to explore it within themselves. And there are those who do *not* want to know it, rightly suspecting it might make demands that would result in a voluntary renunciation of much they now hold dear and which gives them sensuous pleasure.

And thus it is that men and women live lives hemmed in by the senses, unaware of the treasures hid within their own consciousness. While everyone is a potential mystic, most people never unfold their inner faculties, never become acquainted with their larger selves, and remain content to live prosaic and narrow lives.

The genuine mystic is one who recognizes the reality of "the other world," who, perceiving the existence in him, as in all men, of a divine spark, deliberately endeavours to explore his inner self in search of it. Mystic awareness changes, therefore, the orientation of the mind. Instead of remaining externally oriented, it becomes inwardly oriented. Withdrawn from the world of external perception and turned inwards, the

mind is gradually transformed. It transcends the limitations of the personal and gains a deeper insight into the Impersonal Reality.

Danger, however, lurks at the initial stages. For when the mind is turned within, unless the little self is forgotten, the state it enters will be psychic, not spiritual. The glamour of psychic experiences is great. The psychic state brings strange experiences that fascinate and intoxicate and prevent further progress.

We witness today an unhealthy curiosity which drives many to experiment with drugs or other physical means to induce abnormal trances and thereby experience strange "new" psychic states. On some future occasion we may revert to the misuse of such drugs. Here let us only point to this alarming and growing menace and submit that it is a symptom of the diseased state in which the mind of man finds itself, the only cure for which lies in restoring to man faith in and awareness of the Divine Presence, thus leading him to accept the need for self-discipline.

Modern therapy is usually understood as a system to mend or repair the mind. The patient goes to the psychiatrist to have his mind fixed, as he would go to the bone-setter to have his broken leg set right. In ancient psychology the word had a deeper meaning and therapy meant making the man whole. It demanded the inner integration of the man himself; the establishing of the right relationship among the different aspects of his being. In the image of the *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, it is the restoring to the Spirit or the *Ātman* his rightful place as the Lord of the Chariot, to *Buddhi* that of the Charioteer who through the mind or reins will direct the senses, representing the horses. Today the Lord is ignored, *Buddhi* paralysed, while the passionate mind, *Kāma-manas*, leads an independent life and, enslaved by the senses, leads the Chariot astray.

It is high time we should set things right! Let us look within for the Divine Charioteer and behind him to the Lord of Light. This will demand the eradication of selfishness and the unfoldment of the faculty to think away from the personal. We must learn to cultivate the inner, spiritual man by meditation, by reaching to and communion with the Divine, for

> unless the flesh is passive, head cool, the Soul as firm and pure as flaming diamond, the radiance will not reach the *chamber*, its sunlight will not warm the heart, nor will the mystic sounds of the Akasic heights reach the ear, however eager, at the initial stage. (*The Voice of the Silence*)

May we make haste to prepare our consciousness to receive the Light of the Spirit!

NAMRATĀ

ROY WALKER

The End of the Way of Man

[Mr. Roy Walker is an old friend and a distinguished writer, critic, lecturer, and broadcaster. He has recently become intensely interested in Jewish mysticism. Little of the deep inwardness of Judaism has been apparent to non-Jews. The existence of an ancient and continuous mystical tradition in Judaism has been traced by the researches of Gershom G. Scholem in *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism,* etc. But its most remarkable exponent in our time was the late Martin Buber. Roy Walker is author of a book, *The Wanderer and the Way: The Hebrew Tradition in the Writings of Martin Buber* — publication pending in English and German — each chapter of which follows Buber's teaching through its three successive levels: the Biblical, the Hasidic, and the Modern. We publish here for the first time the Modern section of the chapter on the Psalmist, who — in Psalm 73 especially — reveals something of his experience of the actual Presence of God, whose Holy Name Buber renders: I WILL BE PRESENT HOWSOEVER I WILL BE PRESENT.

Mr. Walker's exposition brings out the profound significance of Martin Buber's basic idea of "dialogue." Human lives are ordinarily lived in the blind self-sufficiency of the old Adam; yet it needs only willing consent on our part to open ourselves to the presence of Divinity in all the experiences of life to give us an entirely new dimension of spiritual consciousness, a dimension which represents our truer and higher nature, the End for which our human consciousness was evolved.—ED.]

WE TURN once more to Martin Buber the modern "philosopher," who has been helpfully advised to liberate his teachings from their "confessional limitations" and whose "philosophy of dialogue" has been reduced to little more than a cliché by specialists eager to "apply" these "theoretical" positions in their own field of psychiatric or other work. What Buber has said, and said so well, is certainly useful in many fields. Only (some of his professed admirers seem privately to reflect at times), how odd of God to choose the Jew.

There is small excuse for the non-religious "thinker" who may thus think to skim the comradely cream from Buber's "philosophy" and in fact only misses the real riches. In *I and Thou,* in which I think the word "Jew" occurs only once — in the context of birth — he not only writes that "two great servants pace through the ages, prayer and sacrifice"[1] but virtually identifies religion with prayer in words that irresistibly recall those of Shneor Zalam:

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[1] *I and Thou.* Second edition. With a Postscript by the Author added. Translated by RONALD GREGOR SMITH. (T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh. 1959) P. 82.

In true prayer belief and cult are united and purified to enter into the living relation. The fact that true prayer lives in the religions witnesses to their true life: they live so long as it lives in them. Degeneration of the religions means degeneration of prayer in them.[2]

And it is in the book in which Buber considers the modern philosophers that the basic distinction is made in its most uncompromising form. *Eclipse of God,* he writes:

discusses the relations between religion and philosophy in the history of the spirit and deals with the part that philosophy has played in its late period in making God and all absoluteness appear unreal.[3]

But the religion that is here contrasted with philosophy may survive within, but must by no means be simply identified with, religion as dogma, law, concept, and ritual, with what seems to be the almost inescapable systematization of institutional religion:

If philosophy is here set in contrast to religion, what is meant by religion is not the massive fullness of statements, concepts and activities that one customarily describes by this name and that men sometimes long for more than for God. Religion is essentially the act of holding fast to God. And that does not mean holding fast to an image that one has made of God, nor even holding fast to the faith in God that one has conceived. It means holding fast to the existing God. The earth would not hold fast to its conception of the sun (if it had one) nor to its connection with it, but to the sun itself.[4]

And here, in this book in which Buber confronts some typical modern philosophers, after specific warning against the opposite dangers of gnosis and magic, of "unveiling" and "conjuring" (which are practices by no means confined to ambitious Kabbalists), he has defined true prayer and the self-division that makes prayer almost impossible to modern man, that brings about the eclipse of God, who is hidden only by the shadow we interpose:

We call prayer in the pregnant sense of the term that speech of man to God which, whatever else is asked, ultimately asks for the manifestation of the divine Presence, for this Presence's becoming dialogically perceivable. The single presupposition of a genuine state of prayer is thus the readiness of the whole man for this Presence, simple turned-towardness, unreserved spontaneity. This spontaneity, ascending from the roots, succeeds time and again in overcoming all that disturbs and diverts. But in this our stage of subjectivized reflection not only the concentration of the one who prays, but

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[2] *Ibid.*, p. 118

[3] *Eclipse of God* (Harper Torchbooks, New York. 1957), p. 123

[4] *Ibid.*

> also his spontaneity is assailed. The assailant is consciousness, the over-consciousness of this man here that he is praying, that he is *praying*, that *he* is praying. And the assailant appears to be invincible. The subjective knowledge of the one turning-towards about his turning-towards, this holding back of an I which does not enter into the action with the rest of the person, an I to which the action is an object — all this depossesses the moment, takes away its spontaneity. The specifically modern man who has not yet let go of God knows what this means: he who is not present perceives no Presence.[5]

There is in this essay on "God and the Spirit of Man" no overt reference to Psalm 73. But its presence, the presence of what it conveys to Martin Buber, breathes in every word of the passage just quoted.

The fundamental question remains, or at least the implied answer to it has yet to be made as explicit as is possible in the nature of the case. That in prayer, which is to say in all right living, we should seek the Presence, all may agree "in principle." That the Presence has been realized in some degree by exceptional men the Bible testifies in a manner that carries its own immediate conviction to the reader — even the modern reader — who is genuinely open to it. Abraham's dialogue with God over the destruction of Sodom *is* dialogue. Moses' interrogation of God at the burning bush is answered by a revelation that cannot be limited within — as it also cannot be imagined without — the working of his own "conscience" at having left his people in slavery to a foreign master. And we have yet to consider the later prophets, with their distinguishing "saith the Lord."

But how can man, the ordinary Adam, the average decent Noachic man of good-will, or even the rank and file son of the Abrahamic covenant, aspire— without intolerance and perhaps disastrous presumption — to such Mosaic heights? And, should he do so, will he not fall victim to self-delusion, to schizophrenic fantasies of receiving some infinitely rarefied Third Programme of enlightened guidance, comprehensible only to a spiritual cognoscenti to which he has been not so much elected as self-appointed? We have been told what is the essential posture and purpose of prayer. But what *is* the reply, the response that entitles us to use, with all its overwhelming implications, the fateful word — "dialogue"?

In " Dialogue," the essay which opens *Between Man and Man*, the volume which develops the implications of *I and Thou*, there is a short section on "The Signs." There are probably many modern psychiatrists who would be much perturbed by it as exemplary teaching, although there are doubtless also those who do not suppose that they, any more than the

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[5] *Ibid.*, p. 126.

rest of us, have been vouchsafed full knowledge of the ultimate realities, and who will therefore remain open to a serious consideration of what is here taught. "The Signs" begins with a warning that reminds us of the "hideouts" that every Adam employs, as though by second nature, to escape God's constant question, "Where art thou"?

> Each of us is encased in an armour whose task is to ward off signs. Signs happen to us without respite, living means being addressed, we would need only to present ourselves and to perceive. But the risk is too dangerous for us, the soundless thunderings seem to threaten us with annihilation, and from generation to generation we perfect the defence apparatus. All our knowledge assures us: Be calm, everything happens as it must happen, but nothing is directed at you, you are not meant; it is just "the world," you can experience it as you like, but whatever you make of it in yourself proceeds from you alone, nothing is required of you, you are not addressed, all is quiet.[6]

Still, if "signs happen to us without respite," and if we go out with our whole being to meet them so that, like the love-struck knight in Giraudoux's *Ondine,* all our armour falls off at the spirit's lightest "word," we still expect that they will be disclosed as something highly extraordinary, angelic visions, perhaps, or a voice pronouncing words of revelation or commandment. (Perhaps voices and visions are true myths of intense experience of "the signs" by exceptional persons?) But:

> The signs of address are not something extraordinary, something that steps out of the order of things, they are just what goes on time and again, just what goes on in any case, nothing is added by the address. The waves of the aether roar on always, but for most of the time we have turned off our receivers.
>
> What occurs to me addresses me. In what occurs to me the world-happening addresses me.[7]

Buber is aware that this will be taken by some of the "doorkeepers" of the "tower of the ages" — we are reminded of the Tower of Babel that was to reach heaven — as "a variety of primitive superstition," since by the address of the world-happening to each and every person he clearly does not mean anything that can be rationally reduced to the categories (in themselves genuinely admirable) of physics, biology, and sociology— the domains, we may remark, of those influential secularized Jewish prophets, Einstein, Freud, and Marx. But he also separates himself from the augurs, of whom, as is well-known, there are remarkable modern varieties:

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[6] *Between Man and Man.* Translated and introduced by RONALD GREGOR SMITH. (Fontana Library, Collins, London. 1961) Pp. 27-8

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 28

But whether they haruspicate or cast a horoscope their signs have this peculiarity that they are in a dictionary, even if not necessarily a written one. It does not matter how esoteric the information that is handed down: he who searches out the signs is *well up in* what life's juncture this or that sign means. . . . This is not even the aping of a real faith.

Real faith — if I may so term presenting ourselves and perceiving — begins when the dictionary is put down, when you are done with it. What occurs to me says something to me, but what it says to me cannot be revealed by any esoteric information; for it has never been said before nor is it composed of sounds that have ever been said. It can neither be interpreted nor translated, I can have it neither explained nor displayed; it is not a *what* at all, it is said into my very life; it is no experience that can be remembered independently of the situation, it remains the address of that moment and cannot be isolated, it remains the question of a questioner and will have its answer.[8]

The section of "Dialogue" called "The Signs" — it has been hard to abstain from simply quoting it verbatim — concludes with the key word. We experience the everyday, the commonplace, the here and now, as the address to each of us by the Presence when we know that both it and ourselves are the creation of the Creator who has neither died, as Nietzsche put it, nor retired to concern himself with matters doubtless more momentous, but is its — and our — constantly sustaining Presence, if we condescend to notice it.

"The true name of concrete reality is the creation which is entrusted to me and to every man. In it the signs of address are given to us."[9]

In the Introduction we quoted from Martin Buber's essay, "The Man of Today and the Jewish Bible" in *Israel and the World*. At one point, the Bible is defined in a single sentence:

The Jewish Bible is the historical document of a world swinging between creation and redemption, which, in the course of its history, experiences revelation, a revelation which *I* experience *if I am there*. Thus, we can understand that the resistance of the man of today is that of his innermost being.[10]

In this chapter we have been concerned with prayer as the becoming present of the person who then becomes aware of the Presence. It is also called "the turning." Its only watchword is "Begin again." But since we are considering "the end of the way of man" not only in the sense of this

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[8] *Ibid.*, p. 29

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 30

[10] *Israel and the World*. Second edition with two additional lectures. (Schocken Books, New York. Paperback edition. 1963) P. 94

immediate and constant objective but in the related sense of the mystery of his "end" in death itself, we may conclude with the words about redemption that close "The Man of Today and the Jewish Bible":

> The lived moment leads directly to the knowledge of revelation, and thinking about birth leads indirectly to the knowledge of creation. But in his personal life probably not one of us will taste the essence of redemption before his last hour. And yet here too, there is an approach. It is dark and silent and cannot be indicated by any means, save by my asking you to recall your own dark and silent hours. I mean those hours in the lowest depths when our soul hovers over the frail trap door which, at the very next instant, may send us down into destruction, madness, and "suicide" at our own verdict. Indeed, we are astonished that it has not opened up until now. But suddenly we feel a touch as of a hand. It reaches down to us, it wishes to be grasped — and yet what incredible courage is needed to take the hand, to let it draw us up out of the darkness! This is redemption. We must realize the true nature of the experience proferred us: It is that our "redeemer liveth" (Job 19:18), that he wishes to redeem us — but only by our own acceptance of his redemption with the turning of our whole being.
>
> Approach, I said. For all this still does not constitute a rootedness in biblical reality. But it is the approach to it. It is a beginning.[11]

And in the phrasing of what comes to us when we are in "the lowest depths," the touch of a hand that reaches down to us, we hear once more the accents of the writer of Psalm 73:

> Nevertheless I am continually with Thee;
> Thou holdest my right hand.

ROY WALKER

BEGIN to search and dig in thine own field for this pearl of eternity that lies hidden in it; it cannot cost thee too much, nor canst thou buy it too dear, for it is *all*; and when thou hast found it thou wilt know that all which thou hast sold or given away for it is as mere a nothing as a bubble upon the water.

—WILLIAM LAW

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[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 101-2

G. SRINIVASAN

Sartre and Sankhya

[Our good friend Shri G. Srinivasan, Reader in Philosophy, Mysore University, offers an interesting comparison between the basic conceptions of Sartre's Existentialism and the dualistic metaphysics of Sāṅkhya. Shri Srinivasan's comparison is sympathetic to both schools but he cannot help being struck by the extra difficulties produced by Sartre's "anti-metaphysical presupposition."—ED.]

WHAT is particularly fascinating about Sartre's philosophy is the seriousness with which he addresses himself to the descriptive analysis of human existence. The Sāṅkhya system, in Indian philosophy, presents a similar attempt at understanding the nature of human existence in terms of its constitutive causes and ends. Both systems emerge out of a psychological, introspective attitude of the enquirer, in which he regards himself an object of enquiry without losing sight of his own subjectivity and concreteness. Besides participating in a common field of enquiry and presupposing an identical "subjective" attitude, these systems are both set in a dualistic and atheistic framework. These exterior similarities render any inner contrast between them all the more significant and interesting.

The difference between Sāṅkhya and Sartre appears right at the very beginning, in their respective approaches to the problem of human personality. Sāṅkhya is motivated by a desire for human liberation from misery[1] and its approach to this problem is metaphysical; it accounts for human misery on the basis of the conjunction of two independent metaphysical substances — *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* — whose disjunction brings about human liberation. But Sartre's approach to the analysis of the structure of human existence is marked by his refusal to admit transcendent or metaphysical substances. His two ontological principles — being-for-itself (*pour-soi*) and being-in-itself (*en-soi*) — are the constitutive conditions of empirical human existence and possess no transcendent reality. Thus, while the Sāṅkhyan dualism is one of pre-existing metaphysical substances, Sartre's duality is of ontological principles which have no reality apart from being constitutive conditions of temporal human existence in the world.

The descriptions which Sartre and Sāṅkhya give of their respective dual principles also preclude a simple one-to-one correspondence. The Sāṅkhyan *Puruṣa* is the passive witness (*Sākṣī*) while *Prakṛti* is the active agent (*kartṛ*). But, in Sartre's philosophy, the being-for-itself is mainly an active "possibility" or project, while the being-in-itself is inert.

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[1] ISVARA KRISHNA : *Sāṅkyha Kārikā*. Trans. by S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI. *Kārikā* 1

featureless, and opaque. While the Sāṅkhyan *Prakṛti* is a "triune" reality constituted by the three *guṇas* — *Sattva, Rajas,* and *Tamas* — the Sartrian being-in-itself is a homogeneous mass which does not include in itself any principle of self-differentiation. While the Sāṅkhyan *Puruṣa* is a positive spiritual substance which can exist independently of *Prakṛti* in its state of liberation, the Sartrian being-for-itself is a pure "separation" and a "possibility" and cannot be said to exist independently of the being-in-itself.

In its affirmation of the two pre-existing mutually independent realities, Sāṅkhya commits itself to the *problem* of their "conjunction," which it cannot solve on its own premises, without reducing them to dependence on a "third" reality so as to account for their union as well as for their separation. The Sāṅkhyan dualism hence paves the way for some kind of theism or Absolutism. But Sartre's system is free from any such problem, since his ontological principles are not mutually independent, but converge with each other so as to constitute the temporal human existence, without, however, ceasing to be distinct from each other.

This brings us to a very significant point of contrast between Sāṅkhya and Sartre: starting from the dualism of the mutually independent substances, Sāṅkhya tries to account for their union in human existence; while Sartre, on the other hand, starts from the given unity of human existence and, by his descriptive analysis, discovers the different ontological conditions constitutive of it. Sāṅkhya deduces the unity of human existence from its own metaphysical presupposition of two independent realities, while Sartre, in the absence of all metaphysical presuppositions, describes the structure of human existence within its phenomenological limits.

Since Sāṅkhya starts from "separation" between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti,* their union as disclosed in human existence is regarded as a case of "mistaken identity" arising out of ignorance or lack of discriminative knowledge between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti.* When the illusion of "identity" is replaced by "discriminative wisdom" as to the difference between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti,* the liberation of *Puruṣa* follows. Separation alone is the basic truth of the dual realities in Sāṅkhya, though, however, the illusion of their "identity" and dependence constitutes the basis of empirical human existence. The illusion of "identity" has no metaphysical foundation, but is still of ethical significance inasmuch as it provides for *Puruṣa* the necessary experience (*bhoga*) and paves the way for its liberation (*apavarga*). The Sāṅkhyan analysis of the nature of human existence is thus worked through the distinctions of ignorance and knowledge, identity and separation, bondage and release; and all these distinctions derive their meaning from the Sāṅkhyan dualistic metaphysical source.

Because of its commitment to the dualism of mutually independent separate substances, Sāṅkhya finds it particularly difficult to account for man's "conscious experience." The "conscious experience" of man involves both consciousness and activity. But these two properties are sundered apart in Sāṅkhya and ascribed to two separate realities: *Puruṣa* is conscious but inactive; *Prakṛti* is active but unconscious. To account for human "conscious experience," some kind of interpenetration or convergence between the two realities will have to be admitted. But any such admission would be inconsistent with the Sāṅkhyan irreducible dualism of independent substances. Hence Sāṅkhya interprets any "identity" or convergence between them as only "seeming," and affirms that the real relation between them is only one of conjunction. In this "conjunction" between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti, Puruṣa* experiences *as if* it were active, and *Prakṛti* acts, *as if* it were conscious.[2]

This skilful Sāṅkhyan interpretation of the *seeming* "identity" or convergence of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* as a misapprehension of what is really "conjunction" between them is, no doubt, consistent with its own metaphysical dualism. But the solution seems too verbal to be of any use in describing the constitution of human existence. For it is difficult to understand what the relation of "conjunction" means in a non-spatial, metaphysical context. Especially in the dualistic context of separate substances, "conjunction" can mean nothing more than "disjunctive proximity" between the dual substances, and, so conceived, it would hardly provide scope for the mutual transference of properties between them, as demanded by Sāṅkhya. But in the philosophy of Sartre, the being-for-itself and the being-in-itself are together present in human existence as constitutive of its unity. Sartre's starting-point is not a presupposed dualism of independent substances but a unity of different inherent conditions disclosed in human existence. His philosophy is, therefore, free from the Sāṅkhyan difficulty of explaining the union of two separate substances in human personality. The problem does not arise for him, because he never conceives of the being-for-itself and the being-in-itself as substances existing in separation from each other. They are only two *forms* of Being, converging with each other so as to constitute the temporal, contingent human existence.

This brings us to an important aspect of the philosophy of Sartre. The duality of the being-for-itself and the being-in-itself which is central and basic to his philosophy will be lost unless he maintains their distinctness within the unity of human existence. But Sartre does not find any difficulty in maintaining their distinctness, since he regards it, not as some-

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[2] *Ibid., Kārikā* 20

thing given and pre-existing between the being-for-itself and the being-in-itself, but as something perpetually renewed and affirmed by the being-for-itself in its very identification with the being-in-itself. In other words, the being-for-itself, while projecting itself into the being-in-itself so as to constitute human existence, also constitutes itself as "separation" by distinguishing itself from its own projection into the being-in-itself.

Both Sāṅkhya and Sartre encounter the problem of establishing the existence of other selves. Sāṅkhya seeks to establish the existence of many *Puruṣas* mainly on certain cognitive grounds, such as the perceptible differences in their possession of organs of knowledge and action, and differences of birth and death.[3] The criticism against this view is that the proofs which it advances for the plurality of *Puruṣas* are mainly "empirical," and hence really fall short of proving the plurality of transcendent selves.

The same problem figures in a new guise in Sartre's philosophy, despite his restriction of philosophical enquiry to the level of phenomenal being. His is the problem of the plurality of temporal contingent selves, each of which is a centre of "subjectivity" and "separation." He seeks to establish their plurality, not on cognitive or perceptual grounds as Sāṅkhya does, but mainly on affective or emotional grounds: I know that the other self or person exists, not when I look at him but when I am looked at by him, and caught, especially, in a shameful act. Whenever I experience any limitation on my freedom, I know that the other self or person exists, because only a person like me, who is capable of freedom, can restrict my freedom. But these proofs seem to presuppose the plurality of persons rather than prove it.

It is, in fact, difficult to account for inter-subjective communication on Sartre's premises. The being-in-itself is an inert, undifferentiated unintelligible mass, and hence cannot be said to provide any "medium" for inter-subjective communication. Consequently, each being-for-itself would be shut in the cave which it has carved out for itself in the being-in-itself by its "selective" assimilation.

But in the Sāṅkhya system, the first *Prakṛtic* evolute (*Mahat*), which is affirmed to be Cosmic Intelligence, provides the "medium" for communication between different selves. Moreover, the organs of different selves are all derived from the *one Prakṛti* and are hence "identical" with each other so as to facilitate inter-subjective communication between them. Since the evolution and involution of *Prakṛti* take place separately in relation to different selves, depending upon the moral and spiritual deserts of each, no self suffers any "extraneous" limitation of freedom from

[3] *Ibid.*, *Kārikā* 18

the other. Consequently, in Sāṅkhya, inter-subjective communication need not necessarily be one of mutual conflict as in Sartre's system, but may as well be one of mutual understanding and sympathy.

Human existence has a complex structure and includes different kinds of entities such as one's own body, the things which a person uses as tools for the realization of his projects, and things to which he is indifferent. Though Sartre recognizes these distinctions, the nature of the being-in-itself as described by him can hardly provide any "intelligible" ground for these distinctions which appear on its surface, since it does not include in itself any "purposive" principle of self-differentiation. But in the Sāṅkhya system the distinction between the organs of knowledge and action on the one hand and the objects of experience on the other is explained on the basis of different proportions in the admixture of the three constituents of *Prakṛti* — *Sattva, Rajas,* and *Tamas.* The distinctions perceived in the world are thus given a philosophical basis in Sāṅkhya.

Both Sāṅkhya and Sartre are atheistic. But they are atheistic for different reasons. Sāṅkhya is atheistic because it finds no need for the admission of God into its philosophical framework: God is not the creator of *Puruṣas,* because *Puruṣas* are eternal. God is not the creator of the world of objects, because *Prakṛti* evolves itself into the world of objects. *Prakṛti* is the efficient and the material cause of the Universe, while *Puruṣa* is its final cause. Once the "conjunction" between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* takes place, the rest follows in the dualistic Sāṅkhya.

Sartre's atheism goes a step further than the Sāṅkhyan non-admission of God. In his philosophy, God is not merely superfluous but an obvious "self-contradiction." For Sartre believes that God is conceived as the perfect union of the being-for-itself and the being-in-itself, without the self-separating tendency of the former and the corresponding transiency of the latter. This is an impossible kind of union which man seeks, and believes to have been realized in God; man pursues this impossible ideal restlessly, and it is hence a "useless passion." Thus Sartre believes that man wants to *be God,* but that God is "self-contradictory."

The Sāṅkhyan non-admission of God does not deprive it of a transcendent ethical goal. The freedom (*apavarga*) of *Puruṣa* from all *Prakṛtic* contact is the ultimate goal of human life, as prescribed by Sāṅkhya. But *apavarga* is regarded as transcendent of *bhoga,* and as such can be attained only by overcoming *bhoga. Bhoga* is, hence, a condition to be transcended for the attainment of *apavarga.* Because of this logical connection between *bhoga* and *apavarga,* the purpose of *Prakṛtic* evolution is to provide *Puruṣa* with both of them.[4] *Prakṛti,* which is by itself un-

[4] *Ibid., Kārikā* 21

conscious, acts *as if* it were consciously pursuing the goal of bringing about both *Bhoga* and *apavarga* for *Puruṣa*. By thus conceiving the *Prakṛtic* evolution as quasi-teleological,[5] and *apavarga* as nothing more than *Puruṣa*'s freedom from all *Prakṛtic* contact, Sāṅkhya is able to retain a transcendent ethical goal despite its non-admission of God. The Sāṅkhya ethical affirmation of the transcendent goal completely rests on its metaphysical presupposition of *Puruṣa* as a transcendent substance.

But for Sartre the being-for-itself (consciousness) is not a transcendent substance. It is only a "possibility" which exists inasmuch as it realizes itself in the being-in-itself and also "separates" itself therefrom so as to remain a "possibility" for further modes of realization. The being-for-itself is, hence, not timeless or eternal as the Sāṅkhya *Puruṣa,* but is purely temporal or historical, and within the context of the temporal and contingent existence of the being-for-itself (consciousness), "freedom" means (not absence of contact with what is other than consciousness as in the Sāṅkhyan context but) mere spontaneity, with which it projects itself and realizes itself in the being-in-itself and thereby constitutes the new states of the world. The future possibilities of self-realization thus coincide with the future states of the world, and man's involvement in the world is the basic truth of his existence. His ideal should hence be a "*free* involvement" in which he accepts personal responsibility for choosing his own values and man's realization of these values in the human universe is the fulfilment of himself.

Sartre's analysis of human existence into two *forms* of Being — being-for-itself (*pour-soi*) and being-in-itself (*en-soi*) — can, in fact, be regarded as *suggesting* a metaphysical dualism more or less like the Sāṅkhyan dualism of substances. But Sartre's own presupposition is that to admit any metaphysical substance or transcendent ethical goal as Sāṅkhya does is to deny to man freedom of action and reduce his life to determinism. The non-admission of God and the absence of any fixed, pre-determined, transcendent ethical goal like the Sāṅkhyan are regarded by him as necessary conditions of man's "authentic" existence. But a system of philosophy built on this anti-metaphysical pre-supposition yields only a purposeless, unintelligible universe, and this is the outcome of Sartre's philosophy, as admitted by himself.

G. SRINIVASAN

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[5] *Ibid.*, *Kārikā* 57

[6] Sartre defines Existentialism as "nothing else than an attempt to draw all the consequences of a coherent athesic position." See *Existentialism.* Trans. by BERNARD FRECHTMAN. (Philosophical Library, New York. 1947) Pp. 60-1

HOWARD SERGEANT

Religion in Modern British Poetry

[This is the fifth study of Religion in Modern British Poetry which has appeared in THE ARYAN PATH. Four other interesting studies by our esteemed friend, Mr. Howard Sergeant, have appeared earlier this year.—ED.]

JACK CLEMO is a Cornish poet whose faith appears to have been nourished on all the paraphernalia of the local clay-pits — the dumps, the cinder heaps, the snow-covered quarries — rather than the natural beauty of his native countryside; but that is because his early spiritual struggles were conducted against such a background. In his prose volume, *The Invading Gospel* (1958), which might be described as his testament of faith, he tells us that he had "to fight among the clay-kilns and refuse-barrows of mid-Cornwall the same sort of battle as D. H. Lawrence fought among the headstocks and slagheaps of the Derbyshire collieries."

Clemo lost his father in the first World War, and has lived with his mother in the same four-roomed cottage since the day he was born in 1916, a cottage surrounded by the china clay-pits which provided the material for the kilns where his father worked. When he was five years old, Clemo was suddenly struck blind for a period of several months; and at the age of thirteen he experienced a further attack. He recovered his sight for a time, but this second spell of blindness brought his schooling to an abrupt conclusion. His hearing began to break down when he was eighteen and he has been stone-deaf for most of his life, though recently his hearing has improved sufficiently for him to hear music on records and on the radio. Finally, his sight failed completely in 1955.

His first book of poems, entitled *The Clay Verge,* was published in 1951. In these poems he has little to say in favour of nature and he will have nothing to do with the God of nature-worshippers. His Calvinistic creed and the almost savage mythology of *The Clay Verge* are likely to antagonize those who have been conditioned by other poets to respond in a particular way whenever the "mysteries of Nature" are mentioned:

> My faith and symbol shall be stark.
> My hand upon these caterpillar-tracks
> Bogged in the mud and clay,
> I find it easier to pray:
> "Keep far from me all loveliness, O God,
> And let me laud
> Thy meaner moods, so long unprized;
> The motions of that twisted, dark,
> Deliberate crucial Will

I feel deep-grinding still
Under the dripping clay with which I am baptized! . . ."
("The Excavator")

But the puritanical strength and the intensity of vision underlying these poems, and the organic unity of form and content can hardly be ignored. It is a poetry not merely of renunciation, but of vilification of the natural world. Here and there the technical influences of both Hardy and Lawrence can be discerned, but they are not obtrusive. It would be a mistake to assume — as so many critics have — that the poet is insensitive to natural beauty. The key to his attitude is to be found in the poem from which the foregoing extract is taken:

And so I am awake:
No more a man who sees
Colour in flowers or hears from birds a song,
Or dares to worship where the throng
Seek Beauty and its old idolatries.

This sentence, and other passages in the poem, make it clear that at some stage of his religious quest Clemo has accepted the belief that nature is essentially corrupt. It is precisely because he is aware of his own susceptibility to sense impressions, and fears that his spiritual life may be imperilled by undue attachment to "Nature's teeming perfidies" that he reacts so violently. Refusing to be tricked, he deliberately turns his back upon "fallen Nature" and rejects all temporal beauty. In such poems he is admonishing himself, not preaching to the reader or listener; hence the over-emphatic language.

"The sense of a rebellious anti-Christian element in natural forces had been strong in me from my youth," he says in *The Invading Gospel*. "Before my conversion I had felt it chiefly in relation to sex, but I was also aware of the corruption of the breeding earth." Not unexpectedly, his religious zeal led him into extravagance when he attempted to express his convictions in poetry. This over-emphasis upon isolated points of belief, together with the harsh symbolism of the clay-pits, tended to distort the ideas he was trying to present:

The dark and stubborn mood
Of Him whose feet are bare upon this mire,
And in the furnace fire
Which hardens all the clay that has escaped,
Would not be understood
By worshippers of beauty toned and shaped
To flower or hymn. I know their facile praise
False to the heart of me, which like this pit

Must still be disembowelled of Nature's stain,
And rendered fit
By violent mouldings through the tunnelled ways
Of all He would retain.

("Christ in the Clay-pit")

Yet his conception of Christianity as a "redemptive invasion of nature by the divine grace which is outside nature" would probably be acceptable to most Christians.

There is a strong sexual element in all Clemo's poetry, whether he is referring to human relationships or not. In his earlier poems he was inclined to equate sexual feeling with the corruption to be found in nature ("The Burnt Bush"), and this naturally set up a sense of conflict, since it involved his own instincts as well as his religious ideas. In "The Plundered Fuchsias," where the conflict is most clearly marked, he finds a grim satisfaction in the destruction of the flowers by his lady companion —

sweet vandal hands
Pillaged more blooms, stripped bare
A whole branch —

apparently without appreciating the sexual symbolism of the act itself, and then proceeds to indulge his own nature:

She marred the rhythm of soil,
She checked fertility
And then, the last flower trampled on,
She turned more naughtily
And gave her lips to me.

When he dealt directly with the Calvinistic doctrine of election in his poetry, he placed too much reliance on theological terms and ideas which suggest different things to different people, without attaching a specific meaning to his words, so that a far more rigid form of Calvinism was attributed to him than he actually held, even in his first enthusiasm. In this respect his critics could hardly be blamed for reaching the wrong conclusions; for, in a letter printed by *Cornish Guardian* in 1939, Clemo had already committed himself to a belief "in the God who died and rose again for the redemption of *a certain number of people*." The poems in *The Clay Verge* seemed to confirm what he had stated so explicitly in his letter. In *The Invading Gospel* Clemo reprinted this letter and ruefully observed that if he had had time for revision he would certainly have changed the misleading sentence. What he intended to say was that in every age "God achieves His immediate objective, the creation of an elect nucleus or bridgehead of faith from which He can reach out to shape the world." Clemo's views on predestination — briefly, that though salva-

tion is certain for some people (the elect), it is yet made possible for all — approach those of Barth and Spurgeon, whom he has studied to some effect.

Clemo's second collection, *The Wintry Priesthood,* consists of nine poems making up a sequence for which he was awarded a prize in the Festival of Britain Competition. There is a sense in which the poems of any genuine poet can be said to constitute his spiritual autobiography; in Clemo's case this is true in practically every sense, for most of the poems he has published so far are directly concerned with his own religious experience and highlight the periods of spiritual crisis. *The Wintry Priesthood* is no exception and it is essential to the study of Clemo's work. Quite apart from the fact that it contains some highly individual poetry, it traces his development, step by step, from the isolationist position he had taken up after his conversion to the more enlightened state in which he recognized the need for solidarity with other Christians. The opening and closing poems, appropriately entitled "Cornish Anchorite" and "Priest Out of Bondage," define these two positions. "Cornish Anchorite" elaborates ideas already touched upon in *The Clay Verge* and starts where the previous volume left off, though the language is less violent and the material is better assimilated. The second poem in the sequence, "The Broadening Winter," is inscribed to C. H. Spurgeon. The dedication is not without significance, because, whilst comparing Spurgeon's experience with that of the poet himself, the poem reveals that Clemo's hermitlike isolation was forced on him by his indignation against the apathy of the organized Church and by what he regarded as the betrayal of the Church's proper function. This is made clear in the opening lines:

> What isolates me here in frozen clay
> But that same tidal shock which fell
> First upon England in your day?
> Betrayal of the truth is no new thing
> Within the fellowship of Christ.

In "A Kindred Battlefield" and "The Two Beds" he draws parallels between both T. F. Powys and D. H. Lawrence and himself, and examines the problems of these writers in apposition to his own. Finally, in "The Broadening Spring," he arrives at the point at which he is prepared to repudiate his individualism and seek communion within a revived Church:

> The tide has reached me, all my clay is changed;
> The bed and battleground of solitude
> Lie thawed in fellowship; my symbols fade
> In recognition of the Citadel.

And it is true that the clay-pit symbolism begins to fade from this

point onwards. The sexual element is still apparent in the later poems, though somewhat more restrained, and, taking his cue from Browning's "priest and lover," Clemo seems to be groping towards a conception of the "beloved" as an elect personality mediating between the individual version of the poet and the corporate version of the Church ("Beyond Trethosa Chapel").

Clemo's most revitalizing influences, however, have been not theologians but visiting American evangelists — Renée Martz, the child evangelist, and Dr. Billy Graham, in particular. Indeed, the impact of American revivalism, with its spectacular witness to the power of the Holy Spirit, was mainly responsible for his reaction against the grimness of his early mystical phase before the failure of his sight cut him off completely from the source of his clay-pit symbolism. This remarkable change in outlook is celebrated in his third collection of poems, *The Map of Clay,* published in 1961, and a new "jazz" phraseology begins to replace that previously drawn from the Cornish clayworks —

> God's jazz-drums seemed to thunder. . . .
>
> Hot ragtime stains the austere track
> Bubbles and burns among my glacial clues;
> I shall not find the way back
> To the crag's lip and the wintry bruise

— to match the new mood of pentecostal gaiety which pervades the later poems of the volume.

Normally, Clemo makes use of this jazz diction in a strictly metaphorical sense to symbolize the operation of divine vivacity, to celebrate what he describes as "the triumph of God's jazz over Nature's *Dead March*"; but in "Lunar Pentecost" he employs it in the more literal sense as well, to carry with it all the atmosphere of the modern revivalist campaign with its high-pressure publicity, radio and television programmes, sports-stadium assemblies, and jazz bands, so that the poem can be interpreted on at least two levels. There is, of course, nothing new in the belief that unconditional surrender to the liberating forces of God enables man to escape his natural fate and establish contact with a realm of infinite joy. Yet Clemo clings to this aspect of his faith with passionate intensity, and seems at times to overstress his own triumph over suffering and privation, just as he was disposed to lay undue emphasis on the corruption of all nature in his earlier poems. For instance, in "Beyond Lourdes" he compares his own experience with that of St. Bernadette, to the saint's disadvantage:

> In my own pilgrimage I found

That a vision born of pain
Dissolves in morbid rain.

Faith has schooled me further, brought me round
To the secret you may have lost
Through your suffering: heaven's vivacity
In the child world lit by Pentecost.

To some, especially those without knowledge of the personal circumstances which compelled it, "Beyond Lourdes" may appear a little presumptuous, despite the poet's obvious sincerity: but if we are to get down to the roots of Clemo's intensely religious poetry we shall do well to remember that he takes his stand on a Christian optimism based on the Resurrection, and all that the Resurrection implies. There is no place, he feels, in the Christian way of life for mere resignation or even obstinate courage in the face of suffering in return for spiritual blessing in the next world. The blessing, he says, is in this world and one must have the faith to grasp it with radiant frivolity. In Clemo's own words, the Christian answer to suffering is

> neither resignation nor courage, but faith in all its fullness — the faith that surrenders, covenants, endures the testing and obtains the promise, thus rooting the whole life unshakably and eternally in the faithfulness of God.

HOWARD SERGEANT

In a Hurry

I met an ant hurrying, hurrying, hurrying,
"Where are you going to, ant?" said I.
But he went on hurrying, hurrying, hurrying,
Hurrying on, and he passed me by.

I met an ant hurrying, hurrying, hurrying,
"Why are you hurrying, ant?" said I.
But he went on hurrying, hurrying, hurrying,
Never a nod or a wink in reply.

I met an ant hurrying, hurrying, hurrying,
"Let me come with you, then, ant," I said.
But he went on hurrying, hurrying, hurrying.
Straight down the path by the new flower-bed.

I met an ant hurrying, hurrying, hurrying,
I said, "I shall follow you, ant, that's all."
But he went on hurrying, hurrying, hurrying,
And disappeared over the garden wall.

IRENE RAY

R. M. FOX

Maud Gonne: Her Place in Irish History and Drama

[Our old friend Mr. R. M. Fox pays an affectionate tribute to the memory of Mme. Maud Gonne MacBride in this year of the centenary of her birth. Her selfless patriotism and rare personal grace are a precious memory.—ED.]

IT IS FITTING that in the historical review Recall The Years which marked the opening of the New Abbey Theatre in Dublin an excerpt from *Cathleen Ni Houlihan* by W. B. Yeats should have been included, for this year is the centenary of the birth of Maud Gonne, who inspired the play and took the lead in its first presentation. Her life epitomized the Irish National struggle and she was the queenly figure of Cathleen as portrayed by the dramatist.

The first production of *Cathleen* was in St. Teresa's Hall, Dublin, on 2 April 1902. This was an historic occasion and W. B. Yeats wrote in his note to the play:

> Miss Maud Gonne played very finely and her great height made Kathleen seem a divine being fallen into our mortal infirmity. Since then the part has been twice played by women who insisted on keeping their young faces. The most beautiful woman of her time, when she played my Kathleen, "made-up" centuries old and never should the part be played but with a like sincerity.

For the younger generation in Ireland it has become increasingly difficult to visualize the struggles of earlier years. It is through the life of Madame Gonne MacBride — or Maud Gonne, as she was known to thousands of Irish people — that we can see that period of history, with the turbulence of evictions and starvation following the Famine days; the Fenian struggle with its harsh imprisonments in English convict gaols and the later rise of the National movement expressed in the 1898 Commemorations.

Maud Gonne took a leading part in all these phases of national effort. Her individual gifts of beauty and distinction, her great height and dignity, helped to bring a shadowy, romantic glory to the emerging Ireland. She has written how as a young girl she was drawn into the struggle against the wave of evictions which followed the Famine:

> It was a wild stormy night in the village street of Falcaragh in Donegal. There was a sudden clatter of hoofs, and cries and lights, then two long police cars carrying prisoners, and a mounted escort of constabulary drew up near the inn where I was staying. Young and curious, and fresh from school in France, I made my way through a crowd of women with shawls

over their heads, some of them waiting. There were six prisoners handcuffed together in pairs.

This was her introduction to the Irish scene. Later, encouraged by Michael Davitt, she joined the Land League and helped in the housing of families who were evicted. She recalled a fierce fight when the police tried to arrest Father MacFadden, who supported the dispossessed tenants. A policeman was killed and four men received life sentences. Earlier still, when she was sixteen, she was staying with a family at Navan, close to where evictions were being carried out. One bitterly cold night, her host, a landlord, returned from riding and told how a woman and her children had been put out on the hillside.

"I don't think they'll live through the night," he said carelessly. "I told them how it would be if they joined the Land League."

Maud Gonne returned home next day and soon drifted away from that social circle where people were spoken of with contemptuous indifference and treated worse than dogs.

In Dublin she took an active part in the work of the Celtic Literary Society and helped to found the National Players organization, of which body Yeats was President while she was Vice-President. She also founded Ingheana na h-Eireann (Women of Ireland), with the object of drawing women and girls into National activities. Several of the early Abbey actresses had their training in this movement. She helped Arthur Griffith with funds for his journal and was drawn into the broader National movement along with W. B. Yeats, though he was never politically minded.

Yet the greatest contribution Maud Gonne made was in helping prisoners and drawing attention to their plight. This work began very early, for she wrote:

> With some help and a little diplomacy of my own I obtained from an unsuspicious Home Secretary a permit to visit eight of the seventeen Irish treason-felony prisoners in Portland, three of them had never received a visit from a friend during the ten years of their captivity. I shall never forget that visit. On the way I saw gangs of convicts chained like beasts of burden to great carts of stones from the quarries. At the gate my visit caused a flutter among the officials. A fashionably dressed young girl was hardly the sort of visitor they were accustomed to escort in the "cage."

This work of helping Republican prisoners she continued with tireless devotion throughout her long life. Critics have said that the Republican women, of the Civil War period, helped to increase the bitterness of the conflict. This cannot be said of Maud Gonne. At the "Treaty" period, before the split, she went as National representative to Paris and

did everything possible to avoid conflict between Irishmen. She wanted the fighting to cease because, in her view, the people had suffered too much during the Black and Tan era. She hoped for peace and National unity, but, when the Four Courts was attacked and the pact between Republicans and Treatyites torn up, she returned from Paris and flung herself into the struggle to help Republican prisoners.

Week after week she held her prisoners' meetings in O'Connell Street, in the centre of Dublin. Her organization — the Women's Prisoners' Defence League — arranged for visits and sent in food and clothing for prisoners. They held poster parades and vigils at gaol gates. Maud Gonne took the lead. On one occasion some girls were arrested for posting bills calling attention to the prisoners. So Maud Gonne adjourned the meeting while she pasted up some of the bills. Then she resumed.

She endured imprisonment and hunger strikes. But she never regarded herself as a martyr. When someone complimented her on turning her back on Viceregal functions to serve the people she answered with a twinkle, "But it was very dull there!"

From all over Ireland people came to her for help when they were in trouble. Women were often bewildered when their menfolk were arrested. She piloted them through the courts. I have been with her through remote villages when people came out of their houses to thank her. "Madame, I want to thank you for what you did for my son!" or "Do you remember what you did for my daughter in such a year?" It was like a triumphal procession.

But I imagine the tribute that Maud Gonne would care for most was that voiced at a meeting she addressed in O'Connell Street. She was speaking of the Land League days. "The younger generation do not remember these things." she said, "but I do, for I am an old woman!"

"Cathleen ni Houlihan never grows old!" said an old Irish labourer on the edge of the crowd.

Now it is her Centenary year and she is one of those who are enshrined in the hearts of the people, loved not for their position but for their worth. *And they shall be remembered for ever.*

R. M. FOX

FAME is the perfume of heroic deeds.

—SOCRATES

SUMITRA TALUKDAR

The Associated Country Women of the World

[Shrimati Sumitra Talukdar is an active and devoted worker of the Saroj Nalini Dutt Memorial Association. Her account of the quiet but effective work of an international network of women's associations is of great interest because it shows how wholesome social effects can be achieved without spectacular resources or governmental supervision. What is needed is the quiet devotion to the needs of simple people.—ED.]

THE Associated Country Women of the World (ACWW) grew to its present world-wide affiliation from a woman's personal tragedy. Towards the end of the last century a child died in Canada's rural interior from a milk-borne disease. The bereaved mother got together other mothers and discussed with them the means to prevent the outbreak of such a disease, so that the future generation of children could be spared its ravages. From this discussion group emerged the first Women's Institute. The idea of getting together to work for the good of a rural community soon spread far and wide, and similar Women's Institutes sprang up in many countries of the world.

The first European country to set up such a society was Finland, and their society was known as the Martha Society. This was followed by the Society of United Irish Women, formed in 1910 under the inspiration of Sir Horace Plunkett, who was himself a pioneer in the co-operative movement. It is interesting to note that there was often a close connection between co-operatives and Women's Institutes; frequently one developed from the other. The co-operative movement started, for example, in 1844 in Yorkshire, England, as a measure against inferior goods and high prices, but it gradually branched out into women's co-operatives, followed by societies with broader programmes on rural welfare. These societies were co-ordinated into an international organization, the Associated Country Women of the World. In 1933, at Stockholm, Sweden, the first Triennial session was held.

Our Association was one of the earliest of its kind in India. It was started in 1913 in Pabna, now in East Pakistan, under the inspiring guidance of Smt. Saroj Nalini Dutt. Smt. Dutt was married to a highly placed member of the Indian Civil Service and toured all over rural Bengal with him. This gave her a close insight into the problems faced by our village women and strengthened her determination to do something about them. She realized that the women must learn to depend on themselves and work together. She studied the workings of the Women's Institutes in England and the co-operative movements of the different countries, but her society was not a copy of any of these. It was rather

scaled to suit the particular needs of the village communities of India. After her death, her husband enlarged the scope of her work and founded an association for women's-welfare work which bears her name. This was in 1925. He felt that the best memorial to Smt. Saroj Nalini would be to continue the work she had started with her Mahila Samitis.

The Mahila Samitis operate in both rural and urban areas. Their administration is completely independent, the Association serving to co-ordinate their activities. I quote our annual report:

> The primary objective of these units is to inculcate the feeling of self-reliance in women and help destitute women to find a footing in society. There are forty such units affiliated to the Association. They provide Adult Education and Industrial Training and in certain cases courses in Nursing, Nutrition, Child Care, Physical Training, etc. In addition, they also undertake relief work in national emergencies.

The Saroj Nalini Dutt Memorial Association became affiliated to the ACWW in 1928. It was, in fact, one of the founder members. This projected our activities on to the international scene. We came in touch with workers with similar interests from other countries and could exchange ideas and views. Our representatives went to the various regional and general conferences, and could speak on our aims and our efforts on a much wider forum. The returning delegates often visited sister societies on their way home, getting a first-hand view of the ways and means adopted by other countries to tackle their problems.

I myself had the good fortune to attend the XIth Triennial Conference in Dublin in September 1965. The Conference was a large one, with 1,200 representatives from 46 countries. It must be said that the efficient management and the warm hospitality of the hostess society, The Irish Country Women's Association, made us all feel part of a large family. The ideals of the ACWW, of course, acted as a common bond bringing together what virtually appeared as a miniature United Nations. The time of the Conference was especially trying for us, because our country was then involved in an armed conflict with Pakistan. However, we received sympathetic understanding throughout especially from the Irish, who had themselves gone through violence and partition based on religion.

The ACWW, as one of the Women's International Non-Governmental Organizations (or WINGOS) has consultative status with the Economics and Social Council of the United Nations and with its specialized agencies such as UNESCO, UNICEF, and FAO. This means that a woman living in a remote village can, through her organization, if it is a member of the ACWW, voice her wishes before these bodies. An example of interna-

tional co-operation through the United Nations on a non-governmental level is found in the Pilot Project undertaken by the Saroj Nalini Dutt Memorial Association with funds collected for the Freedom from Hunger Campaign launched by the FAO. The grant came through the ACWW, which disbursed the collections made by the National Federation of Women's Institutes of Great Britain (a member of the ACWW) for the Freedom from Hunger Campaign. The Pilot Project now trains women in home economics, nutrition, child care, family planning, etc., in 18 villages of West Bengal. The Pilot Project villages have already begun to spread their influence to the villages surrounding them, and have become objects of pride in the short three years of their existence.

The approach of the ACWW to the problems faced by country women is a practical one, without any political connections whatsoever. They had subsidized a trainee from Fiji to do domestic science in New Zealand, and another from East Africa to be trained in Sweden.

My impressions of the XIth Triennial Conference at Dublin in September 1965 are of great warmth and friendliness; of earnestness to achieve concrete goals — not necessarily large and world-sweeping, but local ones to improve some local conditions; the moving opening ceremony graced by the presence of the President of Eire; the meeting hall decorated with the flags of the participating nations; the acclaim given to Smt. Aroti Dutt from our Association on her election as the next president of the ACWW; the interchange of ideas, and, lastly, the sense of achievement in being able to talk about one's aims and ideas to an interested and sympathetic audience. My most lasting impression is that the ACWW promises to be as effective an instrument for good as its members can will to make it.

SUMITRA TALUKDAR

ANY GOOD . . . that I can do, or any kindness that I can show to any fellow creature, let me do it now. Let me not defer or neglect it . . . .

—STEPHEN GRELLET

C. RAJAGOPALACHARI

The Unification of Cultures

[Shri C. Rajagopalachari's distinction both as a statesman and as a thinker is familiar to all the world. We have pleasure in printing below his addrers on "The Unification of Culture" which he gave as the S. L. Bhatia Endowment Lecture on 18 August 1966 at the Indian Institute of World Culture, Bangalore. THE ARYAN PATH is in a specially warm relation of sympathy with the objects of this Institute. It is an Indian Institute but it aspires to serve World Culture, for it places faith in the value of both diverse special manifestations of culture in various regions and times and the universal element that underlies all cultures. Rajaji has said something very suggestive in the last part of his address where he says, "Natural synthesis is inevitable." No artificial uniformity will be adequate to the full possibilities of human culture. What is needed is a frank openness to exchange and mutual understanding.—ED.]

IF ONE WISHES to be a man of good health one should observe restraint in eating and drinking. If one wishes to be a good man, one should abstain from untruth and cruelty. If you wish to be a man of culture, you should try to forget your own self and keep the other fellow always in mind. It is only if the ego disappears from one's consciousness that one can attain the high characteristics of a cultured person. This applies as much to women as to men, to boys as well as to girls. It was, I think, Sir Walter Scott who said on his death bed to his son-in-law, "Be a good man, my son." When Scott said, be a good man, he did not mean simply avoid sin. He meant something positive. Now being good in the positive sense is the essence of culture. To be cultured in behaviour is a positive achievement, not just avoiding sin.

These days culture has got mixed up with the arts, music, dancing, painting, sculpture, etc. We cannot help accepting this broader denotation. It has gone too far in public acceptance to be fought against. Words must after all be accepted in the sense in which most people have accepted them. That is the law of language. Culture is not only the conduct and behaviour of a good man but includes love of the arts.

Now there are some who wish to work for an integrated World Culture. I at first thought that the Institute which has conferred on me the honour of this opportunity was among them. But from the papers sent to me I find this is not correct. The Institute was simply an Indian Institute of Culture at first. Later it adopted the name Indian Institute of World Culture. But I do not find among the printed objects of the Institute anything like aiming at the unification of world cultures into one pattern. Perhaps the name of the Institute should more properly

be Indian Institute of World Cultures in the plural.

It is a very interesting issue whether a single unified culture is practicable; also whether it is on the whole a good thing to aim at a unified culture. I intend devoting my talk this night entirely and solely to this point.

A unified code of morals can be drafted for acceptance. Indeed all religions have done it. But culture, as I said before, is different from mere moral behaviour. Culture is made up of positive conceptions — do's and not don'ts only — whereas moral codes, generally speaking, consist of don't's. Don't's can be uniform for all peoples. But do's must differ from place to place, from people to people. The culture of a people is what has grown among them to be recognized as contributing to the joy and happiness of the people as a whole — contributing positively, although not coming under the direction of law or government. Morality is governed by both social opinion and law. But culture is something free and positive. Laws and governments aim at preventing unhappiness, but culture is what contributes positively to joy. Compassion, for instance, is positive and contributes to happiness at both ends. No-one is liable to be punished by the courts for not being compassionate. Compassion in various degrees and forms is a part of the culture-pattern of a people. Vegetarianism is based on compassion. It is not merely a hygienic issue. The Tamil scripture *Kural* puts it clearly: If people did not eat meat, no-one would take the trouble of slaughtering animals. The butcher is the product of the meat-eating habit of people. Helping one's distant relatives and one's clansmen has been a part of the culture of the people of India from time immemorial. It has not yet completely disappeared. No-one could be punished for not doing it. But he who did not fall in line with that element of our culture was looked upon as a brute, whatever his rank in society. In spite of the growing pressure of the Western culture of individualism and the terrible pressure of the cost of living, the Indian culture of helping one's relatives near and distant has not yet completely disappeared, doing more service than Governmental socialism. Robbery, stealing, cheating, are infringements of the moral code and are infringements of the legal code also. Not to cheat is not culture. It is just avoiding a crime. But to be helpful and not to be completely immersed in looking after oneself is culture. Helpfulness expands in widening circles in proportion to one's capacity to be helpful. Help a few people, those nearest to you, if you are not able to do more. But if you are able to do it, help a wider circle. This is Hindu culture both in the North and in the South. Indeed I may claim that the oldest literature of the South lays great emphasis on this. "*Oppuravu*" is the *Kural* word for this element of culture. We should preserve this

word as a precious heritage.[1] Be like a sweet-water reservoir or a fruit-bearing tree in the middle of the village, said Tiruvalluvar. It is a pity that, as a result of the impact of Western individualism, this element of Hindu culture is rapidly disappearing.

Another example of positive behaviour falling within the ambit of culture is hospitality, the readiness to receive guests and callers at any time, which marks Hindu and Islamic social culture. Alms-giving is a striking feature in Indian and Semitic cultures. It is part of our general culture and not merely individual generosity. The utter loyalty of wife to husband, the utter obedience of sons to parents, are also essential elements in Hindu culture. Western culture laid emphasis on self-help, individuality, and the assertion of equality and liberty, which are also quite justifiable, but go contrary to the Hindu cultural elements of wide helpfulness, loyalty to husband, and obedience to parents. Boiled down, all cultures may rest on the same values. But measure and emphasis make a difference, and they go far.

Now, taking up the question I posed at the outset, it is obvious that various peoples, who have lived and grown in relatively independent ways in the various parts of the globe where they have lived for thousands of years, have developed different cultures with features and emphases differing from one another although a common humanity makes all people alike fundamentally. Western culture differs from Eastern, Semitic culture from Hindu culture, Indian culture from the Siamese and Chinese and Japanese cultures. Indeed the culture of North America differs from British or European culture, because of living for a long time in circumstances different from those of the mother countries. Rajputana culture is different from Tanjore culture; Coimbatore culture is different from Tinnevelly culture; and so on. Would it be a good thing to grind all these cultures into one world culture — behaviour, dancing, singing, painting, etc., all to be one admirable standardized pattern?

Things that come into mutual contact do tend to rub off angles and become similar and merge. Synthesis is natural. This natural evolution of sameness cannot be prevented. But is it good to accelerate and intensify this process or is it good to keep harmless differences going? Is the preservation of distinction in cultural features a good thing, or must we seek to remove them as quickly as possible and work for a common world pattern? Does it help the totality of human joy to maintain these differences that have grown naturally, or would it be conducive

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[1] *Kural*, XXII. 8 : *Idan il paruvattum oppuravirku olhār*
Kadan ari kātciyavar.
(The wise who know what is duty will not diminish their benevolence even when they are without wealth.)

to greater joy if we reduce them all to sameness and uniformity?

The form in which I have posed the question must have made it clear already that I would rather like to maintain these differing characteristics in cultures, so as to increase the joy of life. A Persian carpet with its multiple colours and chequered pattern is more beautiful than a single-colour *dhurrie*. Not only several types of music, or of dancing, or of other entertainments, but several differing but harmless types of human behaviour, in my opinion, add to happiness and joy on the whole; not uniformity.

Now, let me refer to the dynamic element of emulation which is roused by proximity and freedom of evolution without being restrained by the goal of uniformity or integration. Progress in the fields where human behaviour and talent count, as they do in the cultural field, is greatly accelerated and augmented by competition. Like production in the industrial field, the cultural arts are assisted by competition. They tend towards stagnation under standardization.

The German example in history is a striking demonstration of what I have said. Before the days of Bismarck, and for some time even during his Chancellorship, Germany was divided into numerous politically independent States, some of them exhibiting even active hostility towards Prussia, which was beginning to emerge in the eyes of the German nation as the hope and standard-bearer of democratic unification. In other parts of Germany there was no drive towards this kind of unity. But (and from here I shall continue in the words of an excellent book of German history recently issued from Bonn)

> all of them have contributed to the progress of the arts and science, winning for the nation a respected place among civilized mankind long before there existed a unified German Reich. Munich, the "Athens on the Isar River" with its humanist spirit and magnificent classicistic buildings, holds in this field a high rank. Its devotion to the arts, its excellent university, its operas and theatres, and last not least, its gaily cosmopolitan life made the city an attraction for friends of beauty and learning all over the world. In 1864 King Ludwig II, grandson of the "Philhellene" Ludwig I, whose son Otto had become the first king of liberated Greece, ascended the throne of Bavaria. He was then only eighteen years old. His magic beauty, his profound love for the arts, his royal demeanour and a strange, fascinating romanticism which found expression in some of the castles he built, were in that sober bourgeois century like an island of golden legend. Among his first acts of government was to call Richard Wagner to his side, with whose genius he found an intimate communion. The lasting monument to their friendship and work is the Opera House at Bayreuth. It has remained a spiritual centre of Europe and a shrine of pilgrimage for music-lovers from all countries. But not Munich alone stands out as a German cultural centre.

> The excellent theatres in Hamburg, Dresden, Leipzig, Weimar, Meiningen, Stuttgart, Dusseldorf and in many other cities are unequalled anywhere in such variety and dispersal. There are the famous museums of Munich, Dresden, Cologne, the Romanesque and Baroque treasures of Wurzburg, Augsburg, Bamberg, Nurenberg; there is Heidelberg with its renowned university, second oldest in Germany; there are the ancient Hanseatic cities, Hamburg, Lubeck, Bremen, with their world-open spirit, and there are countless others, large and small, where the creative spirit has left its mark. "And, of course there is Berlin, the very centre of intellectual, artistic, international life, with its University and Music Academy, its Technical University, its picture galleries, the Pergamon and the Egyptian Museums, its galaxy of theatres and concert halls.

The German record of culture demonstrates that it is not uniformity and merger but healthy competition which is the live force bringing about the rich growth of culture. Not only in Germany, but in Italy also, we could see the same phenomenon of national culture richly growing in spite of division into numerous politically independent regions. Competition in culture helps growth, especially where the emulation is among proximate communities who see one another more often than nations divided from one another by great distance.

I have cited Germany and Italy, whose cultural achievements were contemporaneous with great and deplorable political disunity. I might ask Indian historians to see when and under what conditions Indian literature, scholarship, and philosophy, our arts, music, dancing, architecture, painting, and sculpture, and all else falling within what we call culture flourished. They flourished when India was divided into numberous politically independent or semi-independent states and when we did not know what political unity was. Have they improved under British unity or under our recently consummated *Swarāj* unity? Even after *Swarāj*, as long as the Indian States under the various Rajahs and chieftains were allowed to function, cultural arts throve in competition. No particular advance in these fields has been achieved after the total integration of the States was achieved at the end of the first half of this century.

Even in the matter of education, especially in the early stages, I am very doubtful if we are wise in laying down hard rules and in insisting on uniformity, instead of encouraging a variety of methods and systems and promoting competition, leaving the initiative in the hands of autonomous managements. In every line of human activity, individual enterprise and competition fostered by a tolerance of dissimilarities is the real way to progressive evolution. I do not believe in working for unified culture. We should let nature work out the synthesis, not force it by arti-

ficial pressure. Natural synthesis is inevitable. The domination of one pattern of culture over another as a result of political shifts of power is also inevitable. But if the question is, What is good for culture? I vote for variety and competition and not for steam-rolling into uniformity. A hundred flowers may bloom, and all of them are separately beautiful; and the garden in which they bloom is also as a whole beautiful; separately and together they are sources of ineffable joy. Mao-tse Tung said this and he was right there. We should not under the pressure of political vanities and ambitions destroy variety. Vulgar uniformity is not culture or beauty though it may be politics of a kind.

C. RAJAGOPALACHARI

Publications of the United Arab Republic

WHENEVER I speak of the Middle East and its remarkable recent progress, it is met more often than not with a smile of complacent derision by those who ought to know better. But here is a witness to my viewpoint. The Ministry of Culture, United Arab Republic, publishes each year a catalogue of books, English as well as foreign, published by Egyptian publishers, relating to a wide variety of subjects.

Volume I (502 pp.) is in Arabic, *an-Nasharat al-Miṣriyya li'l-Matbū'at, 1966*, and is provided with the following indexes: Title Index, Authors, Subjects, Educational Books, and Books for Children (total, 150 pp.). The first part gives the titles, authors, and brief descriptions of the books, on the following subjects: General Knowledge, Philosophy, Religions, Social Sciences, Dictionaries, Speculative Sciences, Physical Sciences, Arabic Literature, and History. The descriptions give title, subject, author, publisher, size, and pages. The total of books described is 3346.

Volume II (76 pp.), in English, is called *List of Publications in Foreign Languages deposited in 1964*. The books are mostly in English, with a few French titles. There is a list of main classes, Abbreviations, Principal Publications, School and Educational Books, and several indexes. The total number of publications is 251. The printing, paper and get-up, in paper covers, is very satisfactory and compares favourably with similar publications in any part of the world.

We congratulate the Government of the United Arab Republic on this excellent publication. It is a clear piece of evidence for the intellectual progress of the Arab nation. It will help educationists, scholars, and research workers in all parts of the world. We look forward to receiving such publications thankfully, to preserve them carefully and to comment on them from time to time.

A. A. A. FYZEE

Silence and Song

ONCE I asked my revered teacher, the Poet Rabindranath Tagore, if he would be gracious enough to tell me exactly what he felt whenever a new song was born like a star in his innermost consciousness. And he said, in reply, something to this effect. The incidence of the illuminating experience, he began, was so sudden and startling that in the twinkling of an eye he removed far, far away in time and in space from the plane of consciousness on which he happened to be working, meditating, or resting at that particular golden moment. He was surrounded by a deep and dynamic silence, preceded by a kind of more or less complete self-emptying. He seemed to be at once in a state of awareness as well as of unawareness. The witnessing of the Wonder Supernal was there, but who or where was the witness? If he was there, at least he was not visible or accessible to the point of awareness.

Then, out of the all-enveloping silence, winged forth an eerie, unearthly tune of a song, *sans* words. He was so irresistibly captivated by its newness and charm that he could not refrain from responding to it by humming it in a strain of ecstasy. This continued for several minutes, when, lo and behold! some words started emerging, as if from nowhere and impinging on his consciousness. He took these down then and there. Thus, a song was born, like Minerva full-armed, complete in tune and text. But the joy at the birth of the song was so great that he went on singing it for nearly half an hour, afterwards in the presence of his *Jeevana-devata*, the lord of his life, as if to receive both his benediction and approval that the song had been well rendered.

"And yet," concluded the Poet, "the whole experience remains a mystery of mysteries! You know such experiences rarely, if at all, lend themselves to analysis like a logical argument." I rejoined, in all humility, after thanking him from my heart for his extreme kindness in answering my question, "Indeed, there is more of magic than of logic in such impacts of the Spirit Supreme." And he smiled benignantly and I felt inwardly that he was blessing me.

However, that memorable evening, when I returned to my small mud-hut in Santiniketan, and pondered over what my honoured preceptor had been pleased to tell me, I recalled two sayings of the mystics of the East and the West: "Out of the Silence will come the Vision and the Voice" and "All great art is unconscious."

Oh for spells of such self-effacing, self-revealing silence, so that the true song of Life may be heard in the sanctuary of our soul! And only afterwards — I may add — clothed in words. "The Word was with God and the Word was God."

GURDIAL MALLIK

New Books and Old

An Exposition of the *Gita**

IT HAS BEEN SAID, not without a touch of irony, that, when an Indian has something original to say, he starts writing a commentary on the *Gītā*. Indeed it has been a rather overworked industry, and it is not without considerable misgivings that one approaches a new commentary. For in spite of the enthusiasm of the commentators themselves, readers, more often than not, find them boring enough. But here is a refreshing exception. Keeping close to the text of the *Gītā*, and without departing from the accepted meanings of terms, Shri Rohit Mehta has succeeded in presenting the teachings of the time-honoured scripture in a perspective which I would go to the length of calling a new *Darśana*. One feels that after all there is something to be said for the method. As Kullūka Bhaṭṭa, the celebrated commentator on Manu, said long ago, it is a convention with our teachers to present their own thoughts always in the context of the authoritative tradition: *prāyeṇa ācāryāṇām iyam śailī yat svābhiprāyam api paropadeśam iva varṇayanti.*

The key to the presentation lies in the significance attached to the term *Buddhi*, which the author translates as Super-Mind, a somewhat awkward term, whose freedom from associations may yet be its merit. It is usually rendered as Reason or Intelligence in English. But the connotation of these words fails to do justice to the concept. Nor again is the *Buddhi* of the *Gītā* identical with the first evolute of *Prakṛti* in the Sāṅkhya scheme of categories. It is really the spark of the divine in man, the "kindly light" which leads him on the path of spiritual progress. This is symbolized by the Lord Śrī-Kṛṣṇa in human form functioning as the charioteer of Arjuna. This image of *Buddhi* as the charioteer occurs in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* also.

The word *Buddhi* occurs many times in the *Gītā*, in its own form as well as with modifications and in compounds. The habit of commentators, even the most eminent, of interpreting the word differently in varying contexts, and of explaining it as if it stood for some particular attitude such as singleness of mind, surrender of the fruits of action to the Lord, and so on, has led to much perplexity. The unravelling of the entire web of the *Gītā* depends largely on the tracing out of this unique strand: *Buddhi* as the mediator between mind and the Supreme Being: *Manasastu parā buddhiḥ, yo buddheḥ paratas tu saḥ* (III. 42) and *evam buddheḥ param buddhvā* (III. 43). The status of *Buddhi* is verily comparable to that of the Logos.

Contact with *Buddhi* opens up an altogether new dimension of understanding. The problems created by mind in our mind-ridden civilization can be solved only when the mind is illuminated by *Buddhi*. Towards the close of the book we read: "The Mind to become an instrument of the Super-Mind — this verily is the message of the *Bhagavad Gita*." But how does this *Buddhi* operate? It dawns upon the mind that has come to a poise between the pairs of opposites (*Dvandvas*). It is only the mind so poised that can dwell in union with the Divine, and to which the perception of the Unborn and Unmanifest comes. It is against the background of such perception that the *Gītā* enunciates the gospel of right action. Right action comes to be recognized to the extent that a man frees himself from Reaction (*Vikarma*) and enters into the deep

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* *From Mind to Super-Mind : A Commentary on the* Bhagavad-Gita. By ROHIT MEHTA. (P. C. Manaktala and Sons, Bombay. 202 pp. 1966. Rs. 20.00)

and profound experience of Inaction (*Akarma*) which alone can provide the firm foundation for true action (*Karma*), action free from all contamination of self.

The *Gītā* opens with the "tension of indecision" caused by the distortion of right perspectives. Its finale comes when Arjuna affirms that he has emerged from this confusion (*Moha*) and regained memory of his true nature (*Smṛti*) and is once again poised for appropriate and vigorous action. One of the numerous insights displayed in this commentary is the appreciation of the exact status of Inaction as the basis for action. There is no question here of an Either-Or. "In the Mahabharata war Śrī-Kṛṣṇa symbolizes Inaction even as Arjuna represents Action." Again Śrī-Kṛṣṇa stands for Super-Mind, while Arjuna signifies Mind passing from a state of temporary disintegration to one of integration and harmony. "The illumination of *Buddhi* can come only when the mind is alert and yet utterly negative." Their union is the Supreme Good.

Yoga as described in the *Gītā* is no doubt a synthesis of the three traditionally consecrated paths of Action, Knowledge, and Devotion. But these paths have been dealt with elsewhere also. The uniqueness of the *Gītā* lies in its blending of three principal definitions of *Yoga*: (1) dissociation from all association with pain (*Duḥkha*): all pain is due to the three *Guṇas*, here called the "conditioning factors of the mind." Gaining awareness of this is the first step. "To observe the conditioning process of the mind is itself the beginning of the mind's de-conditioning." It is in this awareness that the significance of the second definition of *Yoga* is to be sought: (2) *Yoga* is equilibrium. "The state of equilibrium is indeed the poise of inaction, and it can be achieved only when the mind is purged of its three attributes." So long as the mind is caught up in the process of an identification with, or condemnation of, the movement of the three attributes, so long there can be no experience of equilibrium or silence. From the standpoint of equilibrium whatever emerges is beneficent and good. The third definition of *Yoga* is: (3) *Yoga* is skill in action. "All actions become perfect when they emanate from the Ground of Inaction or the Ground of Equilibrium." Together they constitute the *Yoga* of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*.

The commentary has to be studied if its merits are to be appreciated. The eighteen chapters of the text are dealt with consecutively in as many sections whose very titles are revealing. It is unnecessary to list them. In the exposition there is some inevitable repetition and overlapping; but then that is a characteristic of the original itself. The present reviewer has a certain familiarity with the *Gītā* and its commentaries for a period of over half a century. This commentary came to him like a breath of fresh air in an over-heated atmosphere. Here one will find a valid and convincing exposition of the teachings of the *Gītā*, a necessary restatement in modern idiom, relevant to the problems of today and free from all obscurantism.

K. GURU DUTT

"The Philosophy of Hegel"*

WRITING "a short book on Hegel for the general reader," says Mure, is like packing "infinite riches in a little room." Hegel's thought is so comprehensive that we must commend Mure for giving a fairly adequate idea of it. The whole question is whether Hegel's ideas can be termed riches or junk. It is the fashion today to regard them as junk, and so anyone who writes a book on

* *The Philosophy of Hegel.* By G. R. G. MURE. (Home University Library. Oxford University Press, London. 213 pp. 1965. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

Hegel (however small) must either refute this charge or plead guilty to it. Mure, like most Hegelians, does neither. He indulges in apologetics.

Mure is always ready with an excuse on Hegel's behalf. "Unhappily Hegel is very often enragingly obscure," but then "German thinking has more density and depth than clarity" and "there is an accent of challenge in his speculative writing which has excited men to pass judgement impatiently" (p. viii). Again, the *Phenomenology* "is more profoundly illuminating ... and at the same time more desperately obscure than anything Hegel afterwards wrote," but "one can fish a few treasures from its bright-dark depths" (p. 62). And yet again, speaking of the impression of capriciousness and arbitrariness of the dialectic, Mure says, "it might only mean that an alternative transition might be as good or better, not that Hegel's is simply false" (p. 38). However, he admits that the "fact that Hegel is bound by the limitations of his own age make[s] it inevitable that much of his dialectic should now appear arbitrary" (*Ibid.*). Then why not say it *is* false; why not call a spade a spade? Obscurities are also always presumed to be "profoundly illuminating," and even if Mure finds them to be so he does not try very often to illumine the "general reader" for whom the book is meant.

There are contradictions which Mure does not attempt to show to be merely apparent. For example, Hegel "held that religion and philosophy have the same interest ... which in religious experience takes imaginative form and in philosophy becomes explicitly rational" (p. 1), but on the next page we find that he "frequently expresses a metaphysical doctrine in imaginative theistic terms *which he does not offer as mere metaphor*" (italics mine). Yet they "provide a useful clue to his meaning"!

Another example: the three phases of the dialectic — thesis, antithesis, and synthesis — "are the logically and not temporally ordered phases of an eternal process" and "each in isolation is an abstraction without meaning" (p. 11). But then we are told that these *logical* phases actually *exist* — in isolation — as feeling, self-conscious reason, and philosophy in the individual and also in a host of historical epochs. The acceptance of the logical interpretation of the dialectic does not *entail* the acceptance of its existential interpretation, and the attempt to justify the latter makes Hegel's philosophy a Procrustean bed. It is significant that Hegel saw the culmination of every dialectical process in something that he approved. Spirit "manifests itself in history," and the manifestation has "culminated" in the "European stage which Hegel conceives as in a broad sense Germanic" (pp. 59-60). Everything has to be "digested ... into his system," with some startling results. Here is his view of slavery: the slave

> exercises his ... skills as an instrument without a true will of his own, and ... his master enjoys the product. But his labour changes the world permanently, as his master's transitory satisfactions do not (pp. 76-7).

So all's right with the world. The Jewish and Catholic religions show the "unhappy consciousness" (pp. 78-9), and Mure comments that Hegel views them "through strong Protestant spectacles" and that "the Middle Ages were neither so unintelligent nor so wretched as he supposes" (p. 79fn.).

Pain, war, and sin are all to be accommodated as necessary stages in the march of Spirit, and all that Mure has to say is:

> If we are repelled by talk of pain as privilege, war as a counter to stagnation, sin ... as somehow furthering the true destiny of man, we should ask ourselves whether by any other line of thought we can make sense

of these (pp. 60-1fn.). Since we cannot, Hegel's line must be true by default!

Obviously false arguments cause Mure no concern. I give three. (1) Thought and being, though "absolute and contradictory opposites," form a unity. Why? Because "thought *is*" and "being is a category of thought" (pp. 8-9)! (2) The Law of Contradiction,

which recommends that contradictions should be avoided, is inadequate, because " 'A is not B' . . . at least partly determines the *nature* of A . . . . If I deny that orange is a primary colour, I do significantly characterize the nature of orange" (p. 13). But how does the value of a negative judgement prove the inadequacy of the Law of Contradiction? (3) Mure writes:

> Hegel points out, very strikingly, that when a man . . . says "I" . . . he has willy-nilly asserted a universal "I," too; for any man can say "I." . . . It is, Hegel believes, not *a* universal, but *the* universal. It is the universe, or absolute spirit . . . which differentiates its identical self in and as the minds of men. (pp. 6-7)

This, he announces, is "Hegel's answer to solipsism." One might as well argue that, when I say "my nose," I assert a universal Nose, the universe itself, absolute spirit, which differentiates itself into everybody's nose!

In spite of Mure's valiant efforts at special pleading, one is left with the impression that had Hegel tried to consume less he might have digested more, or, paradoxically, had he done less thinking he might have had the time to think more. And that might have been better for all.

S. K. OOKERJEE

Hymns from the Vedas. Original Text with English Translation, Introduction, and Notes by ABINASH CHANDRA BOSE. (Asia Publishing House, Bombay. 387 pp. 1966. Rs. 40.00)

The discovery of the Vedas by the West is only two centuries old. But the translations, interpretations, and judgements of Vedic literature by Western scholars in this period have virtually come to stay, though they are diametrically opposed to traditional Indian ideas. Modern Indian scholars too toe the line with Western scholars in adopting a "historical sense" and in adjudging the Vedic material from a socio-anthropological standpoint. The earlier experts usually dismiss Vedic religion as "worship of nature," "anthropomorphism," "polytheism," "naturalistic henotheism," or "kathenotheism," with some glimmerings of a crude pantheism or monotheism. They are all agreed on the point that the Vedic Aryan is a representative of the most primitive stage of religion in man's cultural history. Even President Radhakrishnan — who, by the by, has contributed a very valuable Foreword to the work under review — is found in his *Indian Philosophy* making such remarks as the following:

> The process of God-making in the factory of man's mind cannot be seen so clearly anywhere else as in the *Rigveda* (Vol. I, p. 73).
>
> The simple religion of the Vedic hymns was one of sacrifices. Man's relations with the gods were mechanical, a question of give and take, profit and loss. (*Ibid.*, p. 147)

Even admitting the one-sided emphasis of Sāyaṇa on ritual in his *Vedabhāṣyas,* one cannot say that the modern philosophical and critical approach to the Veda can be taken as doing justice to the poetry, philosophy, or religion of the inspired Vedic seers. For there is a continued stream of *adhyātmic* or philosophical tradition running through such works as the Āraṇyakas, the Upaniṣads, the *Bṛhaddevatā,* the *Nirukta,* the *Bhagavad-Gītā, Manusmṛti,* and the *Brahmasūtras,* which often quote Vedic hymns as scriptural authority and which claim to be no more than digests of the Vedic doctrine. On this tradition was built the big edifice of the Eternal Verbum (*śabdabrahma-vāda*) of Bhartṛhari.

Very few Indians have realized this stream of undiluted monism in the Vedic hymns themselves. Professor A. C. Bose deserves hearty congratulations on attempting to unravel this neglected aspect of the Vedic hymns, not by dogmatic or chauvinistic assertions but by a perceptive selection of the actual hymns accompanied by a very readable English rendering. The best passages from the four Vedas are selected from this new point of view and they are made to speak for them-

selves. The style of the author is at once concise and clear, elegant and forceful.

The subjects have been arranged under the heads of *Jñāna-yoga, Karma-yoga, Bhakti-yoga, Vibhūti-yoga, Rāja-yogā,* and Death, adopting the manner of the *Gītā*. The uniquely Vedic concepts like *ṛta, satya,* and *tapas* and the ideas of beauty, goodness, and devotion have been set forth in a new light which helps to recapture the original spirit and which deserves the attention of scholars and general readers alike.

The treatment of Vedic gods in the Introduction is both illuminating and well-informed. It emerges that the constitutive element in Vedic poetry is what mind brings to nature and not what nature brings to mind. The profound monistic and mystic thought underlying the plethora of Vedic gods is very successfully brought home after the manner of the *Vibhūti-yoga* in the *Gītā*.

The Sanskrit text is neatly printed but without accent marks. The English rendering, which is itself poetic, is printed at the side of the original and facilitates study. The short notes are to the point and designed for the general reader. Throughout, the author has stressed the poetic side of the Vedic hymns without losing his way in philological complexities. In a word, this is a very useful and much-needed publication. It bids fair to create a genuine interest in the subject of Vedic poetry.

K. KRISHNAMOORTHY

The Moving Image: Science and Religion, Time and Eternity. By G. D. YARNOLD. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 234 pp. 1966. 37*s*. 6*d*.)

Dr. Yarnold is well aware of the ambiguity of his title; so, lest the unwary think that here is a work of fiction, he defines the content by a double subtitle: Science and Religion; Time and Eternity. As one who has experienced a pilgrimage "which led me from unbelief to faith, and from a scientific career to the ministry of the Church," he is well qualified in both the spheres indicated.

An earlier work, *The Spiritual Crisis of the Scientific Age,* was well received as a major contribution to the religion and science debate, which has taken on new forms and formidable dimensions in our time. This new work, however, is not a continuation of the argument there set out but "an exploration of the relationship between the temporal and the eternal, to which philosophy, theology, and the sciences must each contribute." Dr. Yarnold is acutely aware of the dangers in our present situation where each man becomes so much a specialist as to be unable to communicate with others. There is urgent need for conversation at the frontiers and, as we have said, this author is one of the few with the varied skills able to conduct it. Thus if "Science and Religion" indicate the area of conversation, "Time and Eternity" represent the content.

The fourteen chapters, at first sight somewhat discursive, have an inner logic which enables Dr. Yarnold to move steadily to a goal in which the conclusion is that of one who has found the clue to the meaning of existence in the Christian revelation. "Christian theology," he asserts, "based empirically on revelation but drawing too on the insights of scientists and philosophers, is our window on to eternal reality." In a discussion of this kind many of the great questions of our time, indeed of all time, are subsumed, e.g.: purpose in the universe; creation and evolution; the relation of contingent to cosmic. It would be too much to expect answers, in whole or in part, to all the questions posed. Yet the breadth of view and the precision of language goes far to make sense of the questions and to suggest an over-arching view of time and eternity on the background of which answers may be possible. Dr. Yarnold is a bold and imaginative author. He may not always be orthodox in any of the fields

in which he moves so competently. Yet in the end we have the impression that here is a man able and willing to use faith and facts in a way which does injustice to neither.

MARCUS WARD

Anti-Slavery and Reform Papers. HENRY DAVID THOREAU. (Harvest House Ltd., Montreal. 155 pp. 1963. $2.50)

This is a volume published in 1963 to commemorate the centenary of Thoreau's death in 1862. Most of the lectures and papers published in this volume were not brought out in permanent form until 1866 — exactly a century ago. They caused little stir then; probably they may cause little stir now. And yet they speak so directly to *our* own great needs, they challenge *us* at so many points, that this reviewer for one hopes that they will be "read, marked, learned and inwardly digested" by all — and how many there are! — who are profoundly unhappy at the way the world wags in 1966. And therefore, dear reader, in the hope of stimulating your appetite for more, I will comment no further, but quote.

Here is Thoreau on Law and Government:

> The law will never make men free — it is men who have got to make the Law free. . . . Is it not possible that an individual may be right, and a Government wrong? Are laws to be enforced simply because they were made? or declared to be good if they are not good? . . . The only Government that I recognize — and it matters not how few are at the head of it, or how small its army — is that power that establishes justice in the land. . . . The effect of a good government is to make life more valuable, of a bad one to make it less valuable.

Then comes a challenge to our economic planning:

> How to make getting a living not merely honest and honourable, but altogether inviting and glorious? — for if *getting* a living is not so, then living is not.

And yet today, it would seem a big step forward if one could say that all ways of getting a living were at least "honest and honourable"! After which he has a sharp word for the would-be reformers, with their societies and organizations for this and that:

> This is the crying sin of the age, this want of faith in the prevalence of *a man*. Nothing can be effected but by one man. He who wants help, wants everything. The true reformer does not want time, nor money, nor co-operation, nor advice.

He was thinking when he wrote especially of Captain John Brown, and his noble campaign for freedom for the slaves, conducted almost single-handed. He goes on to quote John Brown's words to his captors:

> I think, my friends, you are guilty of a great wrong against God and humanity, and it would be perfectly right for anyone to interfere with you so far as to free those you wilfully and wickedly hold in bondage.

Then, in answer to those who criticized Brown for "using violence," he confronts all who, "for the sake of peace," acquiesce in public evil:

> The same indignation that is said to have cleared the temple once will clear it again. The question is not about the weapon, but the spirit in which you use it. . . . What sort of violence is that which is encouraged not by soldiers but by peaceable citizens, not so much by laymen as by ministers of the Gospel, not so much by the fighting sects as by the Quakers?

But you must read the whole book; there is much more to make all of us think, and re-think, the fundamental questions of life in society.

MARJORIE SYKES

British Philosophy in the Mid-Century: A Cambridge Symposium. Edited by C. A. MACE. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 406 pp. Revised second ed., 1966. 40*s*.)

This is almost entirely a reprint of

the first edition (1957). Professor Popper's paper, owing to copyright arrangements, could not be included in it. There has been inserted one by Professor Alice Ambrose and Professor Morris Lazerowitz on Wittgenstein.

The main value of the book is in the first paper, by Professor C. D. Broad: "The Local Historical Background of Contemporary Cambridge Philosophy," which gives exactly what this says, from the point of view of its author:

> Cambridge philosophy tends to be a thin stream, confined to a rather narrow and isolated, if sometimes deep, channel . . . philosophy in Cambridge has been almost completely out of touch with general history, with political theory and sociology, and with jurisprudence.
>
> Complete separation . . . prevails between the study of ancient and of modern philosophy.
>
> Cambridge philosophy . . . has been and is a somewhat peculiar growth, in fact a kind of hothouse plant.

Professor Broad recognizes that views regarded as old-fashioned may be true and is very right in pointing out that this applies to Ward's.

There is much of value in Professor Körner's paper:

> . . . . it is not true that all philosophy is analytical philosophy or even that analytical philosophy is independent of other types of philosophical thinking.
>
> . . . appeal to the man in the street must, I believe, fail because there are so many different men and so many different streets and because there is no reason why one of these streets should be preferred even if it should turn out that it leads through the centre of Oxford and the outskirts of Cambridge.
>
> . . . the great synoptic philosophers of the past have all been masters also in the other fields of philosophical thinking; and . . . to be a tyro in philosophical analysis and to be ignorant of science and mathematics is not sufficient to invoke one into an example of Plato's synoptic man.

R. F. RATTRAY

The Making of South East Asia. By G. CŒDES. Translated by H. M. WRIGHT. (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London. 268 pp. 1966. Illustrated. 35*s*.)

The war in Vietnam has brought South East Asia to our very doors. Every day we read of peace offensives, statements by world leaders, bombings of Vietcong, postures of the U.S.A., China, and Hanoi, and the intransigence of one or the other of the powers. All that the average Indian knows about the area is that in some ways, dark to him, Indian culture has influenced the whole of the region.

This book shows how small the world is and how intimately the influences of China and India have moulded the destiny and formed the national character of the people. It is written by an acknowledged expert in the field who is a corresponding Fellow of the British Academy, a very exclusive distinction. The book is likely to remain the standard one-volume introduction to South East Asia. The countries dealt with are Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma, Siam, and Laos.

The author begins with the geographical framework and pre-history. He then takes each country and gives a brief history — kings and wars, brave deeds and tyranny — and deplores that sufficient materials are not available to give a historical account of the development of society or the ways of the people and their culture. The earliest influence is Chinese, but it is beyond any doubt that the Indian influence was at least as great not only in religion and architecture but also in ways of life. For example, the temples depicted in the book have a striking resemblance to our own Hindu shrines; and the names of the kings, to take only one sequence from Cambodia, are Jayavarman I, II, and III, Indravarman, Yashovardhana, Harshavarman, Ishanavarman. How this influence permeated there originally is not fully known, but apparently it was peaceful penetration, not violent conquest. In Burma, it was Buddhism

that prevailed, but in the South, the Hindu influence was dominant.

The book is admirably composed and rigorously argued. The references are mainly to French sources, but English, German, and Dutch are also used. The get-up is excellent and the index exhaustive.

The Indian Institutes devoted to the study of South East Asia are likely to find the work most useful.

A. A. A. FYZEE

East and West. By C. NORTHCOTE PARKINSON. (John Murray, London. xiv+290 pp. Maps. 1963. 30*s*)

If British hospitals are of Buddhist origin (p. 206); if Roman jugglers reached China, and China in A.D. 166 received a Roman envoy (pp. 93, 102); if Rhages, now a Teheran suburb, was named Europos by the Seleucids (p. 90); if "trade in Arab hands could pass without hindrance from Canton to Cordova"; if Bactriana was "perhaps the only land to have felt the directly competing influences of Persia, Greece, India and China" — such are typical details gleaned from this survey by the famous military and social historian of the "eternal contrast" between "East" and "West." Inverted commas are essential here, for Professor Parkinson draws too strict a dividing-line (e.g., Islam always Eastern, Russia always Western) and underplays the polyphony among different parts of the "East" and different parts of the "West." This defect conditions his basic conclusions, with Africa and "Latin" America left out; his final chapters, "Renascence of Asia" and "Defence of the West" presuppose a too *simpliste* dualism. His underrating of UNO (pp. 257-8) is in accord with this.

In most other respects the book is a delight in its readable aplomb. Unusual insights flourish: the pattern of rebellion within and against rebellion (pp. 6-7); Ireland as a training-ground for the persecution of non-Europeans (p. 180); the triangle of Phoenicians, Persians, and Greeks (pp. 40-3); the uniqueness of Anuradhapura (p. 112); a series of temporal coincidences in Russian and English history (p. 186); 1905 as the year which made 1914 inevitable (pp. 229-30); Marxism as a new Islam (p. 256), etc. He is refreshingly impartial, if with a salutary emphasis (for Western readers) on Asian achievement, and able analyses, e.g., of the inadequacy precisely of "good" Britons in India (Ch. 15).

Certain views are questionable: the "defensiveness" of the Crusades (Ch. 12), the crude condemnations of Western "artistic decadence" (pp. 258-9), and of "Britain in 1963" (p. 223); exaggerations of the "peace" brought by Jenghiz Khan (p. 158) and of Oriental influence in the Dark Ages (pp. 34-5); while surely the Greeks were not just "absorbed in the visible world" (p. 108). The very blurb, too, overstresses Russia's European-ness.

But why vote *either* for pure European or pure Asian? The "One world" will still not lack creative tensions, despite the englobing nuclear threat underrated by the author — whose expert analyses of the historical importance of various weapons perhaps betray a too basic thinking in terms of *conflict*.

Still, this is a lively, humane panorama from the Sumerians to A.D. 1963. There are 24 excellent maps.

TERENCE WHITE GERVAIS

Goethe: Conversations and Encounters. Edited and translated by DAVID LUKE and ROBERT PICK. (Oswald Wolff, London. 263 pp. Illustrated. 1966. 35*s*.)

The authors have with scholarly discernment and artistic taste edited and translated, in chronological order, the material drawn from Goethe's *Conversations* with J. P. Eckermann, Chancel-

lor F. v. Müller (Minister of Justice), the scholar F. W. Riemer (tutor to Goethe's son August), the French-Swiss F. Soret, etc., and from a number of letters (here translated for the first time) from the vast collection compiled by Freiherr v. Biedermann. Six illustrations (Goethe in 1811, 1817, 1832; F. v. Müller, Eckermann, Goethe's house in Weimar) enhance this most welcome volume. About a third of the collection of extracts presents a revised version of Oxenford's faulty translation of Eckermann's world-famous *Conversations*, which Nietzsche in *Menschliches all-zu Menschliches* called "the best German book ever written."

This edition has the general reader and non-specialist in mind. It was a happy thought on the part of the editors to select topics of depth as well as width: Goethe's encounters with statesmen and artists, etc., e.g., with Napoleon, Lavater, Schiller, Grillparzer, Beethoven, J. Paul, H. v. Kleist, Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, the English lawyer Crabb Robinson, the Polish poet A. Mickiewicz. The book is full of exciting reports and anecdotes: the embarrassingly cool reception of G. A. Bürger; Frau v. Stein's story of the wild behaviour of Goethe at Weimar in 1776; Mme. de Staël's reading (in 1804) of her translation of *"Der Fischer"*; Goethe's own reading of a long Scottish ballad — a recital which was only saved from turning into comedy by Goethe's authority and Johanna Schopenhauer's intervention. Moreover, we hear of Goethe's predilection for his old wooden chair instead of comfortable elegant pieces of furniture which are "for people who can't think and don't want to"; about his discriminating love of wine; about his attitude to the "disfiguring mask" of death: "The mediocre portrait painter"; about his belief in Fortuna; and yet again his remark to Eckermann (1824): "in my seventy-five years there have never been four weeks in which I felt really at ease."

The main themes of encounters and conversations in this volume are centred in Weimar, where aristocracy and middle-class society were able to merge into one unique cultural expression under Goethe's creative leadership. He was indeed, as the art-historian J. G. von Quandt remarked, "a man of great profundity" as well as an *"homme de salon."* We recommend this book to all readers heartily.

AUGUST CLOSS

The Teachers of Gurdjieff. By RAFAEL LEFORT. (Victor Gollancz Ltd., London. 157 pp. 1966. 25*s*.)

On its dust cover this book is described as "tantalizingly dramatic (almost a detective thriller!) in the manner of its unfolding." As the writer advances from one fabulous city to another in his fascinating quest for the sources of Gurdjieff's teaching, he peels away in true detective fashion layer after layer of the Gurdjieffian legend, until we are left with the conclusion that it has no longer any meaning for the world today. The truth is not in the movement developed by Gurdjieff's followers. It resides, where it has always been, in the "power houses" of the remote Sufi Masters, who disdain this movement. Mr. Lefort is sent back to his own home, to a nearby "centre," where he is now happily on "the only real, deep and purposeful Path that can lead man to a realization of his destiny." The location of this "centre" is kept secret through fear of "sensation-seekers and cranks."

Should we take this work seriously? Does Mr. Lefort expect us to? Early in his quest he meets Sheikh Daud Yusuf at Kerbala, who tells him, "In January seek Qarmani in Damascus in the copper bazaar. Retreat until then to Jerusalem and think of Isa bin Yusuf. Farewell!" "And he was gone." Then comes a paragraph which perhaps supplies the key to our proper attitude to the whole story. It ends:

I realized with a shock that I had no recollection of what the Sheikh had looked like . . . and had it not been for the rug that lay on the floor before me I might have imagined everything.

Indeed it could be so, and, viewed thus, this exciting record makes very interesting reading.

D. S. MAXTED

Ends and Sayings

"... ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."
—SAMUEL BUTLER: *Hudibras*

Hardly a day goes by when there is not some protest or lamentation in the British press about the appalling increase in noise, and the consequent nerve exhaustion and damage to mental and general health. A beautifully written article by Freya Stark, "On Silence" (*Cornhill Magazine,* Autumn 1966) may be, we can hope, a forerunner of an old-new attitude to silence that could well regenerate our civilization from its cacophonic addiction, now become a nightmare of sound.

The Arabs, she writes, know the silent pause in conversation. In a work of art, in architecture, in music, and in literature, the empty space, the silent pause, or the quietening of images, are a most expressive part of the whole. Human beings never meet perfect stillness in the world, yet the feeling of it is "subtly connected with our most intimate moments of rapture." For her, terrestrial silence is most nearly approached in the high mountains, where everything merges into

a hymn of space and sunlight in which sound has become visual and is not heard but seen . . . . and the human heart recognizes itself as a living note in something that is neither sight nor sound, nor notes nor music, but an offering on the altar of all the world in sight.

She too bemoans the way in which the "pursuit of silence" has gone out of fashion, and how formerly quiet and unsophisticated places now blare with loudspeakers. Nevertheless, she asserts that

many, even among those who are unaware of being dissatisfied with a world of noise, will still open their hearts if they happen unawares upon the undertones of silence.

This theme of silence is found in the ancient mystical classic of the East, *The Book of the Golden Precepts,* particularly in the fragment entitled "The Voice of the Silence." Only as we cease to take the outer clamour and roar for realities, and silence even the inner babble of our thoughts and desires, can the "Soundless Sound," the voice of the Higher Self, blend all our existence into immortality.

In 1852 John Henry Newman's celebrated lecture "The Idea of a University" described the distinctive character of its liberal education, whereby students could learn "the great outline of knowledge," its principles, interrelations, proportions, and values. This lecture was cited by Magnus Pyke — one of the most vital and lucid scientific exponents that we have today — in a BBC talk, "Designing a Modern University" (*The Listener,* 6 October 1966). The science that fathered the first industrial revolution deposed Biblical authority in favour of "the Gospel

of Work" and an economic *laissez-faire* ("the survival of the fittest"). These in turn have become untenable since further scientific research developed the second industrial revolution of mass-production and automation. Science, Magnus Pyke declares, has changed many of our attitudes to life, but cannot be applied to morals or even to the complex body-mind relationship. The difference between universities and technical colleges (even when covering the same subjects) is one of attitude. How is the liberal quality of university education to be maintained? He suggests a School of Liberal Studies in Science (as already proposed by the University of Manchester) whose graduates would rank in the world as do B.A.S and M.A.S, and who, as post-graduates, would work for qualifications in specialist sciences. Though university graduates should be able to earn their living, the university should take a longer view than mere education for employment to meet economic demand. Mr. Pyke dismisses the illogical prophecies of an ever-increasing population, ever-rising "standards of living" (so-called), and an ever-multiplying need for scientists. Changes always settle eventually to a new equilibrium, and there are signs that the "wisdom of the tribe" is turning anti-utilitarian, and towards "things of the spirit."

Will industry need as many applied scientists as supposed? Automation, etc. makes much of their work redundant. Is the university the best place to train them? What the universities really need to provide are "the few precious people" of original ideas, outstanding ability and insight, and — still more necessary — the many liberally educated men and women, non-specialists, but able to understand science and to relate it both to the intangible intellectual values and to the business of greater efficiency in practical life. While a greater co-operation between industrial scientists and outstanding university workers could be fruitful in technical developments, the universities' "paramount service" would be this production of liberally educated "generalists" able, further, to communicate their views with literary clarity, and with conviction.

The new universities of the last century broke and discarded the "rigid bonds of Anglican dogma" and perhaps discarded the baby with the bathwater. Their own alternative, "an optimistic belief in progress," has broken under a mass of new knowledge, and "today we inhabit a philosophical vacuum in which we live in a state of moral weightlessness." Magnus Pyke cites Newman again that "knowledge is one thing, virtue is another," since knowledge "gives no command over the passions, no influential motives, no vivifying principles." He suggests that the new university, in addition to all the departments of various arts and sciences, should "include a Department of Moral Philosophy to rethink the purpose for which the accomplishments of the effective cultured man can virtuously be directed." Here, in a still cynical age, is a brave declaration that, like all things of the spirit, is also sound common sense.

It is interesting to compare the claims of the advocates for and against factory farming. It "keeps down the cost of food" and, without it, standards of living would fall, stated a nutritionist from Cornell University, U.S.A. (over on a visit to Britain sponsored by Rank-Hovis-McDougall), when addressing a conference on the vitamin requirements of hens kept under what are euphemistically called "intensive farming" conditions (*The Guardian*, 16 August 1966). Different are the views of Dr. E. S. Schumacher, Economic Adviser to the National Coal Board, speaking to the Ruth Harrison Advisory Group and the West of England Campaign against Factory Farming (15 October 1966). Ruth Harrison's book *Animal Machines* stirred the public conscience two years ago about the

terrible exploitation of farm animals and birds for cheap mass-produced food — and increased monetary profits. Factory farming, Dr. Schumacher declared, is completely the wrong answer to the world's food problems, especially for the hungry nations already beset with unemployment, as well as lack of capital and machinery. He followed this up with some facts about real intensive cultivation. Farm productivity per man in the U.S.A., with an investment of over a hundred thousand pounds behind the average farmworker, was among the highest in the world.

But productivity *per acre of agricultural land* was only half that in Britain, which in turn was a quarter of that in the United Arab Republic. Countries with the highest productivity per acre included Malaya, Ceylon, and other developing countries which practised very intensive cultivation with minimum use of artificial fertilizers or mechanical aids but provided very many people with work. (CHARLES DAVY, in *The Observer*, 16 October 1966)

"Labour-saving" factory farming would increase both rural unemployment and consequent problems of swollen urban populations having insufficient work. Dr. Schumacher has formed an Intermediate Technology Development Group Ltd., which aims to give the kind of aid really needed in such conditions, i.e., "simple do-it-yourself kits" for improving farming with the least possible capital outlay — bettering rural water supplies, grain storage, fencing, and improving seed and livestock, etc. — in other words, fighting hunger by means of "an agricultural rebirth."

Professor W. H. Thorpe of Cambridge University brought out the moral principles involved in factory farm techniques, which, he said, would be liable to prosecution if performed by a British scientific laboratory. A Wiltshire farmer who also spoke blamed the housewives' demands that gave encouragement to such methods. The failure by factory farmers (and their customers) to see the relationship between moral principles and long-term practical efficiency is a tragedy of greed whose nemesis must fall on both deliberate and blindly thoughtless participants. Those who are fighting for natural, humane, and effective ways of farming will need all the help we can give.

ERRATUM

WE REGRET that, by a last-minute mishap at the press, the second sentence in the introductory editorial note to "East and West in Romain Rolland" (THE ARYAN PATH, November 1966, p. 487) was disordered. The following two sentences should have appeared:

> Shri Ramana Murti teaches Political Philosophy and has done research in Gandhian non-violence, having published a book later on *Non-Violence in Politics* (1958). He has also published a book on *Commonsense about Defence* (1959), and as a result was invited to work on a project on Arms Control and Disarmament at Stanford University, California.

EDITOR